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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Christopher Todd Lee 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Marketing 
 
June 2014 
 
Title: Consumer Linguistics: A Markedness Approach to Numerical Perceptions 
 
 
Marketing is about numbers but not necessarily just a number. From a big crowd 
to a half empty arena, adjectives carry numerical associations. The research within this 
dissertation builds on that idea while focusing on markedness, a linguistics theory, which 
has been called the evaluative superstructure of language. For example, asking “How tall 
is the person?” is not an indication that the person is tall but merely a neutral way to ask 
about a person’s height. Tall, in this case, is considered an unmarked term given its 
neutral meaning. Asking “How short is the person?” however, implies the person is 
actually short in addition to asking for their height. Linguistics literature has touched on 
the power of language in numerical estimations but has not fully explored it, nor has 
linguistics literature transitioned to the marketing literature.  
Study 1 begins to explore markedness in a consumer setting by using Google 
Trends to show that unmarked terms, such as tall, are searched more frequently than 
marked terms, such as short. Study 2 shows that using an unmarked term results in 
significantly higher estimates of crowd size than using a marked term but is not 
significantly different than using a neutral term. Study 3 incorporates numerical anchors, 
which reduce the markedness effects. Study 4 illustrates how an unmarked term results in 
a wider range of crowd size estimates than a marked term. Study 5 shows how 
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markedness effects are largely eliminated based on the source of the message (team) and 
capacity constraint of the arena. Study 6 incorporates time to show that markedness 
effects are stronger in a judgment framed as per day than per year. Studies 7, 8 and 10 
show how a marked term, such as half empty, results in significantly different numerical 
estimates over time. This effect is eliminated when reference to a point in time, such as 
“at halftime”, is removed (study 9). These findings highlight the role of markedness in 
consumer judgment and have important implications for a variety of marketing theories. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION !
Marketing is about numbers but not necessarily just a number. It is a big crowd. A 
short cab ride. A long plane flight. An old car. A cold beer. A half empty stadium. 
Wherever consumers are in life, they are faced directly or indirectly with numbers. From 
a consumer behavior perspective, research often focuses on the numbers. Should the 
ticket price be $19.99 or $20.00? Should the package be 12 for $10 or 6 for $5? Although 
actual numbers are a very important part of consumer behavior, marketing research often 
overemphasizes the quantitative component of numbers and underestimates the 
qualitative cues that have numerical consequences.  
Academic literature on numerical processing is beginning to emphasize 
qualitative components and conversational cues that extend beyond the simple numerical 
value presented in the frame. From exploring how people respond to using different units 
such as 1 year versus 365 days (Zhang and Schwarz 2012) or days versus weeks (Monga 
and Bagchi 2012), recent literature is emphasizing conversational cues and norms (Grice 
1975) in addition to other qualitative aspects of the frame.  
Numerical processing research (e. g., anchoring) has convincingly shown how 
low and high numbers presented in a variety of scenarios affect perceptions. Linguistics 
literature has touched on the power of language in numerical estimations but has not fully 
explored it, nor has it transitioned to the marketing literature. The goal of this research is 
to examine the qualitative cues that may affect numerical perceptions, propose a more 
systematic approach based on linguistics, and empirically test these linguistic subtleties. 
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Research Opportunity 
 
Understanding numerical perceptions is critical to consumer behavior research 
given the prevalence of numbers in a variety of marketing contexts. From anchoring 
(Jacowitz and Kahneman 1995), to left digit effects (Thomas and Morwitz 2005; 
Manning and Sprott 2009) to right digit effects (Bizer and Schindler, 2005; Coulter and 
Coulter, 2007; Naipaul and Parsa, 2001; Schindler, 2006), research on actual numbers is 
extensive.  Recent research, however, has called for a broader understanding of 
quantitative judgment, which includes qualitative cues. Zhang and Schwarz (2012, p. 
258) state: 
 
In short, there is more to quantitative judgment than numbers or units alone, and 
future research may fruitfully explore the interplay of numerical and 
conversational processes in context. 
 
Similarly, Epley and Gilovich (2010, p. 21) provided three ways in which anchoring, 
a primary theory within current numerical processing research, may be expanded moving 
forward:  
  
(1) by analyzing more systematically the different types of anchors that occur in 
everyday life 
(2) by identifying important contextual moderators of anchoring effects, especially 
social moderators 
 !
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(3) by considering a wider variety of consequences of anchoring beyond an 
immediate influence on the extremity of a given judgment 
 
 Both Zhang and Schwartz (2012) and Epley and Gilovich (2010) emphasize 
further research into contextual and conversational factors of numerical judgment (e. g., 
linguistics, units, directional cues, magnitude). For example, asking how big a crowd is 
versus how small a crowd address is addresses Epley and Gilovich (2010) by exploring 
the different types of anchors in everyday life. Similarly, referring to an arena as half full 
versus half empty contributes to the Zhang and Schwartz (2012) call for research by 
addressing the interplay between numerical and conversational cues. A broadening of the 
traditional sense of quantitative judgments to include linguistics may be the foundation 
for a new approach to numerical perceptions. As such, the primary research question of 
this dissertation is: 
 
“How do linguistics cues, specifically markedness, effect quantitative judgments?” 
 
Contributions !
This dissertation contributes to the existing marketing literature in a number of 
ways.  First, this research brings the theory of markedness into mainstream marketing 
research. Markedness is a linguistics-based theory that has strong implications for 
marketing, given its emphasis on communication and how words are interpreted in a 
variety of settings.  
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Second, this research builds on markedness, referred to as the superstructure of 
language (Battistella 1996), by showing its effect on numerical perceptions in a variety of 
settings. The literature provides a strong overview of the breadth of numbers-based 
theories and the importance of linguistics, and specifically markedness, in judgment and 
decision-making. From estimating crowds at football games, to estimating time spent 
watching television, to exploring rates of attendance growth and decline over time, this 
research illustrates the effect of markedness in business scenarios. Furthermore, this 
research goes beyond numerical estimation to show how markedness plays out in real 
world contexts (such as search trends on Google), and inferences people draw from a 
slight deviation in a numerically equivalent frame such as something being half empty 
versus half full.  
Finally, this research presents a road map to further explore the critically 
important role of linguistic cues in research on judgment and decision-making.  Similar to 
the merging of psychology and marketing, this dissertation argues for a similar bond 
between linguistics and marketing with the goal of better understanding consumer 
behavior from a linguistics-based approach.  
 
Document Framework !
The document is broken into four primary chapters. Chapter I, the Introduction, 
includes a brief overview, research opportunity, contributions and document framework.  
Chapter II, titled Literature Review and Theory Development, explores existing 
literature as it pertains to quantitative judgments. The chapter focuses on theories of 
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quantitative perceptions of numbers, theories on qualitative perceptions of numbers, and 
contextual factors (speed, distance, etc.) in which quantitative and qualitative cues may 
both play a role. Various theories are discussed to highlight the importance of numerical 
judgment, while laying the groundwork for an expanded use of markedness theory in 
consumer judgment. 
 Chapter III, titled Experimental Studies, represents the experimental portion of the 
dissertation. Ten studies are conducted to test and expand on existing theories on 
numerical perceptions. More specifically, studies are conducted to explore the role of 
markedness on numerical perceptions. The results suggest that marked and unmarked 
adjectives play a significant, and sometimes surprising, role in how we perceive and 
estimate numbers. In addition, markedness plays a role in perceptions beyond numerical 
judgments, including scarcity and competiveness. The findings imply that marketers and 
consumers need to understand and appreciate better the role of subtle linguistic cues in 
marketing communications. 
 Chapter IV, the Discussion, discusses theoretical and managerial implications of 
the findings from Chapter III. A theory is proposed that incorporates markedness to 
explain how particular language cues influence numerical perceptions. In addition, 
Chapter IV discusses managerial implications and directions for future research.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
 
Theories on the Quantitative Perceptions of Numbers 
 
Framing occurs when “equivalent descriptions of a decision problem lead to 
systematically different decisions” (Sher and McKenzie, 2006, p. 468). Interestingly, 
anchoring, which is generally considered a form of priming, offers a very similar 
definition. Tversky and Kahneman (1974, p. 1128) claim anchoring occurs when 
“different starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial 
values.” Although anchoring is considered priming, the definitions suggest that the 
primary difference between anchoring and framing comes down to the starting point and 
to whether different versus equivalent information is presented. Similarly, priming is 
defined as an “initial exposure to a concept [that] subconsciously affects people’s 
subsequent judgments and choices” (Miron-Shatz, Stone, and Kahneman, 2009, p. 888). 
New research is beginning to show, however, that the differences between framing, 
priming and anchoring (a specific form of priming) may not be as clear, thanks to 
conversational cues that have historically been overlooked in the marketing literature.  
Sher and McKenzie (2006) show that equivalent frames are not as equivalent as 
past literature has suggested. The authors coin the term information leakage to suggest 
that a listener (or consumer) gains information from the speaker’s choice of frame, and 
thus the information in the frames is not equivalent. The listener (or consumer) draws 
normative information from a (marketer’s) choice of frame, although the two frames may 
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appear logically equivalent. Given recent developments suggesting qualitative effects on 
numerical perceptions, a deeper exploration of conversational cues may yield patterns or 
results that effect existing research on numbers-based theories like anchoring. 
 
Anchoring 
 
The accolades for numerical anchoring are impressive.  Furnham and Boo (2011) 
call it “one of the most robust cognitive heuristics.” Wegener, Petty, Blankenship, and 
Detweiler-Bedell (2010) say “anchors influence just about any type of judgment.” 
Kahneman (2003) says anchoring and adjustment effects are “among the most robust 
phenomena of judgment.” The majority of these studies, and commentary on the 
robustness of anchoring, emphasize numerical anchors but largely ignore other linguistics 
cues within the judgment scenario. 
As mentioned, anchoring occurs when “different starting points yield different 
estimates, which are biased toward the initial values” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, p. 
1128). Interestingly, the Tversky and Kahneman (1974) quote does not specifically 
mention a numerical starting point, although the majority of initial studies following 
Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) groundbreaking article focused on numerical anchors.  
Although a discussion of anchoring could arguably lend itself to a discussion of 
variations of the numerical anchors themselves, such as left-digit effects (e. g., Manning 
and Sprott, 2009; Thomas and Morwitz, 2005) or right-digit effects (e. g.,  Coulter and 
Coulter, 2007; Schindler and Kirby, 1997), the present discussion primarily emphasizes 
linguistics additions to numerical anchoring, framing and priming. 
 !
8 
Anchoring and adjustment is the original approach to this topic, in which people 
adjust, albeit insufficiently, from a provided anchor value (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  
A simple, yet powerful, exploration of this effect was conducted by Jacowitz and 
Kahneman (1995). Respondents were asked to estimate a variety of quantities from the 
amount of meat eaten per year by the average American to the height of the tallest 
redwood tree to the number of bars in Berkeley, California.  A pre-test helped generate 
anchors based on responses in the 15th and 85th percentile. The 15th (low anchor) and 85th 
(high anchor) percentiles in the calibration group were used as anchors for a follow up 
study in which estimates were routinely biased in the direction of the high or low anchor. 
For example: 
 
(A). Is the height of the tallest redwood more or less than 550 feet? 
(B). Is the height of the tallest redwood more or less than 65 feet? 
 
When respondents were asked whether the height of the tallest redwood tree was 
550 feet (A), the median estimate was 400 feet. When respondents were asked whether 
the height of the tallest redwood tree was more or less than 65 feet (B), the mean estimate 
was 100 feet. Adjustment from an anchor occurs when an anchor is self-generated 
(i.e., not provided by the experimenter), but a different process of adjustment is utilized 
by a person when the anchor is provided by the experimenter (Epley and Gilovich 2001, 
2005). 
The traditional anchoring and adjustment paradigm has partially given way to 
other explanations of anchoring such as selective accessibility (Strack and Mussweiler 
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1997; Mussweiler and Strack 2001) or confirmatory hypothesis testing (Chapman and 
Johnson 1994). Both theories suggest that the anchoring effect is not solely based on the 
actual anchor (number) but on other accessible information. Chapman and Johnson 
(1994) showed that an extremely high anchor results in diminishing returns of the 
estimate, which suggests that the respondent is considering other available information 
that is cued by the anchor. Strack and Mussweiler (1997) showed an anchoring effect 
occurred if the anchor and target estimate were both in height or width but did not occur 
if one was height (width) and the other was width (height). In other words, being primed 
that the Brandenburg Gate was 150 meters tall had no effect on perceptions of the width 
of the gate. This study is particularly important for the purposes of this dissertation as it 
confirms that anchors do not simply work because of the actual number but are dependent 
on consistencies in other information such as dimension. 
Given the shift to an accessible knowledge approach to anchoring, additional 
studies have looked at anchoring from an attitude and persuasion perspective (Wegener et 
al. 2001, 2010a, 2010b; Blankenship et al. 2008). When motivation and ability are high, 
people use accessible information that is relevant to the task at hand (Blankenship et al. 
2008), which is similar to a selective accessibility approach. When cognitive load is 
increased, however, people are more susceptible to the numeric prime (Blankenship et al. 
2008).  
 Simonson and Drolet, (2004) showed that the mechanisms of numerical arbitrary 
anchors work the same in buying (Willingness To Pay) and selling (Willingness To 
Accept) situations. Respondents were placed in a willingness to pay condition (“What is 
the highest price you would be willing to pay for this [toaster]?”) or willingness to accept 
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(“What is the lowest price you would be willing to accept for this [toaster]?”) and an 
anchor was present in the scenario. The authors primarily use arbitrary anchors such as 
social security numbers, as do others such as Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003), and 
do not discuss the linguistics cues that are present in the various conditions. The 
transition to a knowledge, attitude, and accessibility-based approach, as opposed to one 
strictly emphasizing the specific numerical prime, suggests that the qualitative context of 
the anchor is important, which conceptually supports the emphasis of this research. 
 Chapman and Johnson (1999) describe anchoring as “a pervasive judgment bias 
in which decision makers are systematically influenced by random and uninformative 
starting points.” Although it is easy to agree that it is a pervasive judgment bias based on 
years of literature, describing the starting points as random and uninformative seems 
inaccurate, particularly in a marketing setting. Are the purchase quantity limits in a 
grocery store (e. g., Wansink et al., 1998) random and uninformative, or perhaps, even 
more importantly, are there situations where marketers could provide starting points that 
are not random and/or uninformative? Surely, with today’s technology, marketers could 
utilize sales data on the fly to adjust purchase quantity limits, in an ethical manner, based 
on the mean or median volume of purchases.  
 In a more real world scenario, Northcraft and Neale (1987) showed that a listing 
price anchor not only effected undergraduate students but also expert real estate agents. 
In their study, real estate agents were shown a list price of $65,900 (low anchor) or 
$83,900 (high anchor) and subsequently asked to provide their appraisal value, selling 
price, purchase price, and lowest acceptable offer.  The anchor significantly influenced 
all estimates even though a real estate agent's evaluation of a property should be 
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independent, as they argued themselves, of a list price. This study highlights the power of 
anchoring even in high-risk judgments such as real estate. Further studies of real world 
transactions have confirmed the anchoring effect in real estate (Genesove and Mayer 
2001; Bokhari and Geltner 2011). In a study measuring actual consumer purchase 
decisions, Wansink, Kent, and Hoch, (1998) showed that purchase quantity limits (e.g., 
limit of 4 cans vs. limit of 12 cans) significantly influence the amount of soup cans 
consumers purchase. Customers who saw a limit of 12 purchased, on average, 7 cans of 
soup while customers who saw a limit of 4 purchased 3.5 cans.  Although a high anchor 
reduced purchase incidence, the overall purchase quantity was still greatest with the 
highest quantity limit anchor (12 cans). Anchoring is a prominent numerical judgment 
theory but, as discussed, continues to incorporate more linguistic based cues and frames. 
 
Framing 
 
As mentioned, framing occurs when “equivalent descriptions of a decision 
problem lead to systematically different decisions” (Sher and McKenzie, 2006, p. 468). 
Framing research is often based on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1981), which suggests variations in loss and gain frames. For 
example, consider the following example based on Kahneman and Tversky (1979): 
 
(A). 50% chance to win $1,000, 50% chance to win nothing 
(B). $500 for sure 
  
 !
12 
In the above scenario, respondents prefer the guaranteed gain (B). Next, consider 
a similar scenario framed as a loss: 
 
(C). 50% chance to lose $1,000, 50% chance to lose nothing 
(D). Lose $500 for sure 
 
In this loss scenario, respondents typically favor the gamble (C).  This change in 
preference based on loss or gain highlights prospect theory and many theoretical 
arguments behind framing. In a marketing or product context, framing is described as 
occurring when consumers' “product judgments vary as a function of the verbal labels 
used to define specific product attribute” (Levin and Gaeth, 1988).  Marketing literature 
on framing with numbers has covered a range of applications from percentage-based 
discount frames (Heath, Chatterjee, and France 1995) to product attribute information, 
such as meat being 75% lean versus 25% fat (Levin and Gaeth, 1988). While discussed in 
more detail below, recent research suggests that frames may be logically equivalent but 
not informationally equivalent (Sher and McKenzie 2006) due to linguistic cues, 
conversational norms and assumptions about the speaker. 
 
Numerosity  
 
Numerosity is a “judgmental strategy in which people disproportionally base their 
judgments of area, quantity or probability on the number of units into which a stimulus is 
divided” (Pelham, Sumarta, and Myaskovsky, 1994, p. 125). Although numerosity does 
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not necessarily change quantity (i.e., cutting 1 pizza into 8 slices instead of 6), it often has 
significant effects on perception of quantity. For example, Pelham and colleagues (1994) 
showed that people perceived a higher monetary value of coins when there were more 
total coins (e.g., nickels instead of quarters) displayed in spite of both conditions having 
the same monetary value. The numerosity effect, however, is primarily effective when 
people are under heavy cognitive load. Still, in the context of numerical perceptions, this 
effect may suggest that distances expressed in feet (e.g., 5,280 feet) may be perceived as 
longer than when it is expressed in miles (e.g., 1 mile) because the same distance is 
divided into more parts in the feet condition than in the miles condition.  
 Yamagishi (1997) showed that participants rated cancer as riskier when it was 
framed as “kills 1,286 people out of 10,000 people” as opposed to “kills 24.14 out of 100 
people”. While Yamagishi (1997) argues it is difficult to use the numerosity heuristic as 
an alternative explanation due to differences in cognitive load from Pelham and 
colleagues' (1994) study, similarities can be drawn between the two studies. Pandelaere, 
Briers, and Lembregts (2011) suggest this type of effect occurs when people focus on the 
number of units and not the type of units. They argue that the unit effect is a basic form 
of the numerosity effect, which leads us to a further discussion of qualitative theories 
pertaining to numerical perceptions. 
 
Theories on Qualitative Perceptions of Numbers 
 
Linguistics is the scientific study of human natural language (Akmajian et al. 
1995) or, as defined in the marketing literature, a “comparative study of the structure, 
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interrelationships, and development of languages” (Winick, 1961, p. 54). Although 
linguistics is composed of a variety of subtopics from morphology to phonology to tropes 
(see Moltmann, 2009), semantics and pragmatics are arguably the most important from a 
marketing perspective. Marketing studies incorporating linguistics typically focus on 
framing of offers. Low consistency cues (e.g.,  “regularly price at”) and high-
distinctiveness cues (e.g.,  “compare at”) have been shown to be quite robust in 
marketing (Grewal, Marmorstein, and Sharma 1996).  Although linguistics has a wide 
range of sub-theories, a few key linguistic-based theories are discussed below, given their 
potential application to numerical perceptions. 
 
Markedness 
 
The theory of markedness goes back as far as the 1920’s (Battistella 1996) but 
gained traction in the 1960’s and 1970’s with articles discussing the concept of marked 
and unmarked adjectives (Bierwisch, 1967). In a declaration of the importance of 
markedness, it has been billed as the evaluative superstructure of language (Battistella 
1996). More recently, the notion of markedness has been called “as central to grammar as 
energy is to physics” (Smolensky 2006, p. 781). Huttenlocher, Higgins, and Clark (1971, 
p. 488) suggest an unmarked adjective “indicates the presence of a property which can 
extend indefinitely in an upward direction” while a marked adjective “indicates the 
absence of that property, the extreme lower bound being zero.”  While markedness 
includes a wide variety of parts of language (c.f., Battistella, 1996; De Lacy, 2006; 
Moravcsik and Wirth, 1986 for a broad view of markedness), this research emphasizes 
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aspects of markedness with potential numerical interpretation. Consider these three 
questions: 
 
(A) How tall is the man? 
(B) How short is the man? 
(C) What is the height of the man? 
 
 Clark and Card (1969) suggest there are two primary distinctions between 
unmarked (A) and marked (B) terms. First, unmarked adjectives can be used in a neutral 
sense. Asking, “How tall is the man?” (A) is not an indication of his height but merely a 
neutral way to ask the height of the man (C). Second, unmarked adjectives refer to both 
an area on a scale and the scale itself. For example, a scale from bad-good is a goodness 
scale and not a badness scale (Clark and Card 1969). As shown above, the unmarked 
term (A) seems equivalent to simply asking a man’s height (C). The marked term (B), 
however, seems to suggest the man is actually short. In another practical example, when 
stating “The board is six feet long”, long references a dimension of measurement but 
does not suggest that the board is actually long in length (Clark, 1969). Conversely, “The 
board is six feet short,” sounds conversationally awkward to the average person in spite 
of the use of short, suggesting that the board is actually short in length. According to 
Clark (1969), unmarked adjectives such as long have two senses (i.e., magnitude of the 
dimension and dimension of measurement), but marked adjectives such as short have 
only one (e. g.,  magnitude of the dimension). Simply stated, the unmarked word “is 
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typically the usual, the normal, the positive, the common, and the neutral or less specific, 
compared to the marked member” (Fraenkel and Schul, 2008a, p. 520).  
Building on previous work (Clark and Card, 1969; Clark, 1969), Lehrer (1985) 
suggests several criteria for markedness, particularly as it applies to antonyms, with 
several similarities to Clark and Card (1969). Frequency and context are two important 
criteria as they suggest unmarked words appear in more contexts and thus are more 
frequent.  Any adjective (or antonym pair) that adds to the original word becomes a 
marked work. For example, happy is an unmarked term, but unhappy, by nature of the un, 
becomes a marked term.  This phenomenon has particular implications for antonyms as 
the unmarked term, such as friendly, will be the positive term and the marked term, 
unfriendly, becomes a negative term.  
One interesting criterion involves measurement and numbers, which deserves 
particular attention given its potential application to this research. Lehrer (1985) argues 
that, in conversationally appropriate dialogue, only unmarked terms can appear in 
measured phrases. For example, 7 feet tall and 6 feet wide are conversationally normal, 
but 7 feet short and 6 feet narrow are not. Lehrer (1985) states that only unmarked 
adjectives can appear in measured phrases, but from a marketing perspective the 
questions becomes, “Should this rule be followed?” Perhaps a marked term, or member 
as referenced by Lehrer (1985), such as a 6 feet short table, makes a particular attribute 
stand out to the consumer and thus has implications for the overall persuasiveness of the 
marketing message. See table 1 for additional properties of markedness. 
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Table 1. Properties of Markedness (reproduced from Lehrer, 1985) 
1.     Neutralization of an opposition in questions by unmarked member. 
2.     Neutralization of an opposition in nominalizations by unmarked member.  
3.     Only the unmarked member appears in measure phrases of the form Amount Measure      
Adjective (e.g., three feet tall).  
4.     If one member of the pair consists of an affix added to the antonym, the affix form is 
marked. 
5.     Ratios can be used only with the unmarked member (e.g., twice as old).  
6.     The unmarked member is evaluatively positive; the marked is negative.  
7.     The unmarked member denotes more of a quality; the marked denotes less.  
8.     If there are asymmetrical entailments, the unmarked member is less likely to be 
'biased' or 'committed'. Cf.  
        a.     A is better than B. A and B could be bad.  
        b.     B is worse than A. B must be bad, and A may be as well. 
 
 
As shown in the list above, markedness offers a theory to arrange words 
systematically into categories and to study how they are perceived in a variety of 
marketing contexts. Although existing consumer literature has looked generally at 
implications of various framing and word choices, this research emphasizes a linguistic 
approach based on the theory of markedness.  
 
Similar Concepts to Markedness 
 
Although markedness has similarities with other theories such as perceptual 
salience and code switching, it does not appear to have been used in a systematic way to 
study consumer response to numerical information. Perceptual salience has been 
proposed in some parts of literature as being analogous to markedness (Luna and 
Peracchio 2005). Other literature, however, has suggested that given an unmarked 
element could be high salience or low salience, there is not a strong relationship between 
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markedness and perceptual salience (Hume 2008). Thus, there is not a direct relation 
between marked and perceptual salience, which is more commonly found in the 
marketing literature.  
Code switching is another term that is used in conjunction with markedness, but it 
focuses on bi-lingual exchanges in which a person chooses to converse in a different 
language depending on the situation (Myers-Scotton 1995, 2000). In other words, code 
switching involves the decision by a bilingual individual to literally switch to a different 
language (marked) as part of a conversation (Luna and Peracchio 2005). As such, the 
newly adopted language or word becomes marked as it stands out from the rest of the 
language of the conversation. Although code-switching is one of the few markedness 
approaches found in a marketing context (Luna and Peracchio 2005; Luna, Lerman, and 
Peracchio 2005), it emphasizes actual language preferences (e. g.,  Spanish or English) 
and does not emphasize numerical cues or estimates.  
 
Argumentative Orientation 
 
Argumentative orientation, largely credited to Ducrot (1980), “relates the value 
for the adjectival variable to a conclusion that the speaker wishes to support by uttering 
the sentence containing the gradable adjective” (Maat 2006, p. 30). Similarly, it is 
defined as the “tendency for speakers to choose the profile in line with the conclusion one 
wants to draw and for hearers to interpret the profile accordingly” (Holleman and Pander 
Maat 2009, p. 2204). In other words, speakers (or marketers) choose a particular frame 
with the goal of having the respondent (or consumer) respond in a particular way. From a 
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markedness perspective, Holleman and Pander Maat (2009) argue that an unmarked word 
corresponds to the goal and thus choosing one frame over another guides the respondent 
to a particular conclusion. For example, in one of their studies they used the following 
prompt: 
 
For tennis pro Melle van Gemerden, 2005 was a good/bad year. He (A) won 2 (B) 
lost 5 out of his 7 international tournament matches. 
 
When respondents saw “good year,” they indicated (A) “won 2” was an 
appropriate response but when they saw “bad year” they indicated (B) “lost 5 out of his 7 
international matches” was a better response. In other words, the frame the speaker uses 
argues on behalf of a particular response. As such, the authors refer to framing effects as 
profiling effects as they paint a semantic picture. Furthermore, the authors propose a 
heuristic to handle argumentative orientation (reproduced from Holleman and Pander 
Maat, 2009): 
 
Speaker’s maxim: when a situation lends itself to description in terms of a two-
valued variable, profile the component carrying the value that best fits the 
direction of the conclusions one would prefer to be drawn from the utterance.  
 
Recipient’s corollary: when a situation lends itself to description in terms of a 
two-valued variable, the component that is profiled indicates the direction of the 
conclusions the speaker would prefer to be drawn from the utterance 
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As such, a marketer choosing the word many results in the consumer interpreting 
the information in a similar vein. Conversely, the use of few guides the consumer to draw 
a conclusion in line with that profile.  Consider another sports example: 
 
(A) The team is 10-2. How [many/few] fans do you expect to attend each 
of the final four games of the season? 
(B) The team is 2-10. How [many/few] fans do you expect to attend each 
of the final four games of the season? 
 
 Although the speaker’s maxim suggests a two-valued variable, it is possible that 
based on fuzzy trace theory (Reyna and Brainerd, 1991; Reyna and Brainerd, 2011) the 
record of the team is quickly stored as good or bad. When a 2-10, or bad, record (A) is 
discussed followed by a question on attendance, the speaker frame may be suggesting, or 
arguing, on behalf of lower attendance. Similarly, few fans, a marked term, may argue on 
behalf of lower attendance as well. Argumentative orientation theory is an important 
component of this dissertation as it falls in line with information leakage, in suggesting a 
frame not only leaks information, but it also provides a direction in which the speaker, or 
marketer, wants the consumer to respond. 
 
Fuzzy-Trace Theory 
 
Fuzzy-Trace theory is a dual-processing theory that argues people store both 
verbatim (i.e., quantitative) and gist (i.e., qualitative) information in parallel (Reyna and 
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Brainerd 1995, 2008; LaTour, LaTour, and Brainerd 2014). Based in psycholinguistics, 
the theory distinguishes between verbatim, exact wording, and gist, essential meaning, 
forms of information (Reyna 2012b). The theory states that encoding and storage of 
verbatim or gist representation is based on the task (Reyna 2012a).  
Fuzzy-trace theory argues that understanding the gist of the information is more 
important than understanding the information verbatim (Reyna and Brainerd, 1991). A 
verbatim view is seen as precise and quantitative while a gist view is seen as vague and 
qualitative (Reyna 2008). Gist to verbatim processing is a continuum but preference, 
when possible in the decision making task, is given to gist representations. For example, 
consider the classic Asian disease problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981): 
 
(1A) If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
(1B) If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be 
saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. 
 
(1C) Program C:  If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
(1D) Program D:  If Program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that nobody 
will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die. 
 
In the above example, the guarantee is preferred in the positive frame (1A), but 
the risk is preferred in the negative frame (1D).  Now, consider the problem again, but 
from a fuzzy-trace perspective: 
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(2A) If Program A is adopted, some people will be saved. 
(2B) If Program B is adopted, some people will be saved or no one will be saved 
 
(2C) If Program C is adopted, some people will die.  
(2D) If Program D is adopted, nobody will die or some people will die. 
 
As Reyna and Brainerd (1991) showed, in the above example, the guaranteed 
option in the positive frame (2A) and the risky option in the negative frame (2D) are still 
preferred but the preference and effect is even stronger. In other words, a greater 
percentage of the people preferred Program A and Program D in the gist representation 
than in the verbatim representation. While the above example was a choice task, the 
fuzzy-trace theory potentially has implications for other numerical processes in terms of 
how words and numbers are interpreted and retrieved by consumers. Consider the 
following sports-related example: 
 
(A) The basketball team is expecting a crowd of 12,000 people.  
 
Potentially the verbatim information (12,000) in the above example is more 
important in a judgment task such as “How many people do you expect to attend the 
event?” because the answer involves a number but less important in a decision task such 
as “Would you attend the event?” Fuzzy-trace theory explores how people process 
numerical information in gist or verbatim and thus has implications for the research 
conducted in this dissertation. 
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Qualitative Applications of Numerical Framing !
Literature emphasizing numbers, particularly anchoring, focuses on the effect of 
actual numerical digits but often ignores a qualitative context such as markedness 
(e.g. tall vs. short) or other linguistics cues such as conversational norms (Grice 1975). 
Asking whether a building is old or new, or whether a crowd is big or small, has been 
shown to result in different answers (Harris 1973), which highlights the power of 
qualitative adjectives and adverbs. This phenomena was further emphasized by Bass, 
Cascio, and O’Connor (1974), who showed that varying qualitative expressions of 
frequency and amount result in different numerical estimations.  For example, in the Bass, 
Cascio, and O’Connor (1974) study, an expression such as “an exhaustive amount of” 
results in a quantitative value of 59.27 units, but an expression such as “hardly any” 
results in a value of 2.28.  Although not in a marketing or real world scenario, these 
studies open the door for a systematic and broad theory of qualitative and quantitative 
based numerical processing.  
 
Speed and Strength 
 
In a very popular psychology experiment on language and memory, Loftus and 
Palmer (1974) showed that words such as “smashed” (40.5 miles per hour) resulted in 
different mean speed estimates than words like “contacted” (31.8 miles per hour). 
Although the article is titled “Reconstruction of automobile destruction: An example of 
the interaction between language and memory,” it also emphasizes a language effect on 
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quantitative responses. In other words, language has numerical cues that effect judgment 
and decision-making. The majority of articles building on Loftus and Palmer (1974) 
emphasize memory as opposed to the potential for language to play a major role in real-
time, marketing-based, numerical judgments.  
The Loftus and Palmer (1974) study highlights the power of words but did not 
utilize a markedness approach in determining what verbs to utilize to indicate speed. A 
markedness approach, using opposing adjectives, could involve questions such as “How 
fast were the cars going?” versus “How slow were the cars going?” Other studies have 
since taken a markedness approach (Kallio and Cutler 1987) but emphasize memory tasks, 
do not incorporate anchoring, and are not in a marketing context. Building on Loftus and 
Palmer (1974), markedness has been shown to effect the accuracy of response to 
questions about a crime (Hovancik 1984). Respondents who were asked questions with 
unmarked adjectives, such as “How tall was the man?” responded with more accurate 
answers than those respondents who were asked questions with marked adjectives, such 
as “How short was the man?” The verbal cues of speed could have marketing 
implications for plenty of industries, including insurance, which could encourage higher 
adoption by framing accidents in different manners. Or the effect could also influence a 
car sales context with a similar framing, in which both the verbal and numerical cues are 
utilized to elicit different responses pertaining to the safety of a new vehicle. 
 
Directional Cues 
 
The majority of research on anchoring utilizes examples with a neutral qualitative 
form of measurement such as asking the length of something rather than how long or 
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short which has markedness implications.  For example, in the classic Jacowitz and 
Kahneman (1995) study, respondents were asked for estimates on the length of the 
Mississippi River, distance from San Francisco to New York, number of United Nations 
members, and other generally neutral forms of measurement. The qualitative effect on 
anchoring in these tasks is largely ignored in the literature. In the Mississippi River 
example (Jacowitz and Kahneman, 1995), the respondent was asked, “Is the length of the 
Mississippi River more or less than [2,000/70] (in miles)”?  The same question could be 
framed utilizing unmarked and marked terms such as long and short.  
 
(A) Is the Mississippi River longer than 2,000 miles? 
(B) Is the Mississippi River shorter than 2,000 miles?  
(C) Is the Mississippi River longer than 70 miles? 
(D) Is the Mississippi River shorter than 70 miles? 
Conceptually, the four different expressions seem to generate a different sense of 
the length of the Mississippi River while framing the question using unmarked and 
marked terms. Pairing an unmarked term with a high (A) or low (C) numerical anchor 
may result in significantly different estimates than combining a marked term with a high 
(B) or low (C) numerical anchor. Combining the power of numerical anchoring 
(e.g., Jacowitz and Kahneman, 1995) with markedness cues (Lehrer 1985; Battistella 
1996) could enhance existing anchoring effects if the qualitative term (e.g.,  long) and 
numerical anchor (e.g., 2,000 miles) are in agreement and reduce effects if they are not.  
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Magnitude  
 
A fairly new and understudied area of anchoring is that of magnitude priming. 
Conventional research suggests a numerical anchor results in a numerical response biased 
by the initial anchor. Recently, Oppenheimer and colleagues (2008) showed that 
anchoring is not just a numerical phenomena but a magnitude prime that crosses 
modalities. In their study, they illustrated how drawing a short (long) line resulted in 
short (long) estimates of the Mississippi River. In addition, the authors showed that 
physical anchors activated “mental representations of magnitude that are independent of 
target or rating scale” (p. 22). In other words, anchoring is more than a numerical starting 
point that biases a numerical estimate, but a magnitude prime that could bias a host of 
judgments and decisions in both the mental and physical world. The authors brainstorm 
future studies and applications like the size of pencil effecting student evaluations or the 
length of a line’s effect on perception of price at a movie theater.  
In another example of anchoring as a magnitude prime, Wong and Kwong (2000) 
showed that the anchor serves as a relative-size prime but not as an absolute-numerical 
anchor. The authors showed the absolute value of the anchor is more important.  In 
addition, the authors show that the same numerical anchor could be used as the high or 
low anchor based on the absolute value of the number. Although more studies are needed 
to better understand anchoring as a magnitude prime, it represents a very promising 
direction while also highlighting the power of anchoring beyond the conventional 
paradigm. 
Recent literature (Wong and Kwong 2000; Oppenheimer et al. 2008) suggest 
magnitude priming is an interesting future direction for numerical judgment research. A 
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markedness approach may provide a structure to magnitude priming and build off studies 
like Wong and Kwong (2000), which evaluated anchoring effects when the person saw 
7.3 kilometers versus 7,300 meters. Numbers can cue magnitude and, as previously 
discussed, words can as well. Does the combination of a high number and large 
qualitative cue result in a bigger magnitude prime? This research begins to address this 
question by systematically pairing qualitative cues with numbers. 
 
Unit Framing 
 
The formal concept of unitosity is relatively new to marketing literature and refers 
to a “reliance on units as cues for making judgments” (Monga and Bagchi 2012). For 
example, 5 feet and 60 inches are mathematically equivalent, but consumers may rely on 
the units (feet vs. inches) in some situations and numbers (5 vs. 60) in others. The 
preference for units or numbers can be cued based on perceptual salience (e.g., charts 
showing units or numbers) or cognitive salience (e.g., concrete vs. abstract mindset). The 
unit effect can be eliminated by reminding consumers that information can be presented 
in multiples such as 1 year equals 365 days (Pandelaere et al. 2011). The authors used 
comparisons where the units were the same in the comparison, and no mathematical 
calculation was necessary in order to make a decision. More advanced decisions such as 
making a food choice may bring in multiple units (calories per serving, servings per 
container), which could complicate the unit and number effects. 
While arguably a magnitude prime as well, Zhang and Schwarz (2012) illustrate 
the difference between 1 year, 12 months, and 365 days in terms of granularity. As an 
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example, they suggest a conversation over a jail term in which one person says the 
sentence was “1 year,” but another says “366 days.” The question they answer is, “Who 
seems more knowledgeable?” Finer-grained estimates are typically viewed as more 
precise and accurate, although the effect can be eliminated if the entity communicating 
the information does not follow conversational norms established by Grice (1975).  For 
example, when the speaker’s knowledge was assumed to be low, the unitosity effect goes 
away as the level of granularity (e. g., smaller units) exceeds the perceived knowledge of 
the speaker (Zhang and Schwarz 2012). The reliance on units in certain situations has 
implications for a host of marketing initiatives such as construction projects, timelines 
and even package pricing (e.g., multi-price strategies). Bagchi and Davis (2012) looked at 
order effects of $29 for 70 items versus 70 items for $29 and found that the first piece of 
information is salient if packages are large and price calculations (e.g.. 70/$29) are 
difficult. Future work can look at unit effects on perceptions of package (multi-price) 
pricing and when the number versus the units becomes salient.   
Units are interesting as well because they can convey math equivalence (e.g., days 
per year) or lack of math equivalence (e.g., feet per floor). Burson, Larrick, and Lynch 
(2009) showed that increasingly the size of the scale or units (e.g., per week to per year) 
effects preferences and valuations. In a concept they call discriminability, the authors 
propose that expanded scales help people tell the difference between choices more than 
smaller scales. For example, making a choice between products that are $8 per month 
($96 per year) versus $10 per month ($120 per year) might be easier in the per year 
framing. While the authors suggest scales can be multiplied by arbitrary numbers and 
maintain the same ratios, the studies experimentally looked at dropped calls and movies 
 !
29 
per week. There is additional opportunity to look at the interaction of mathematically 
equivalent units (e. g., hours per day) or units that combine expanded and contracted 
scales (e.g., days per year). 
 Monga and Bagchi (2012) look at comparisons between information with 
different units (e.g., 42 inch table vs. 5 foot table). Respondents were exposed to both 
units in dollars (price of the table) and units in length (either inches or feet but not both). 
In a comparison setting, however, it is not unreasonable for consumers to make decisions 
between items with different units. Thus, the study could be expanded to decision tasks 
that involve comparisons between products with different units. As previously mentioned, 
there is also an opportunity to further explore ratio units that are mathematically 
equivalent or constricted (e.g., hours per day) versus those units that are not (e.g., miles 
per day). 
Further expanding on Grice's (1975) conversational norms, Monga and Bagchi 
(2012, p. 187) suggest that “People usually communicate small changes via small units 
and large changes via large units.” Days, rather than weeks, would customarily be used to 
indicate a change of less than 7 days. In other words, 3/7 or 4/7 of a week is not used in 
general conversation or marketing campaigns. Thus, units can help signal the size of a 
change in addition to, or possibly in contrast to, strictly numerical information. While 
emphasizing numerical precision and signaling of advertiser competence, Xie and 
Kronrod (2012) also call for more research examining familiarity with various units. One 
question that arises is at what point do consumers switch units? For example, it might be 
odd to say something is 60 inches away, but using 60 inches in reference to the size of a 
television screen is perfectly normal. 
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 Monga and Bagchi (2012) suggest future research could look at classes of units or 
quantities that elicit unitosity.  For example, Chandran and Menon's (2004) work could 
lead to classification of temporal units. As the authors discuss, what constitutes near 
future? Where do minutes, hours, days, weeks, months or years fall into temporal 
categories in terms of the anchoring/magnitude effects or their importance in decision 
making (unitosity)? Such an investigation could lead to significant developments in 
studies on temporal construal (Liberation and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003).  A 
theoretical approach from linguistics and markedness may help develop a better 
understanding of how consumers use information beyond simple numerical cues to make 
judgments and decisions. If taking a broad approach to markedness, in which the 
unmarked term is conversationally normal (Fraenkel and Schul, 2008a), future studies 
could determine the appropriateness of particular units and how it effects consumer 
perceptions. For example, inches or feet are arguably unmarked terms when evaluating 
table length, but yards is arguably a marked term. Utilizing markedness theory may help 
address many of the questions that have been raised from recent research into units and 
numerical framing.  
 
Temporal Framing 
 
 Chandran and Menon (2004) show that framing a health issue as per day 
(compared to per year) makes the risk appear more concrete. Per day messaging increases 
self-risk perceptions, intentions to exercise cautionary behavior, and the effectiveness of 
risk communication. Conversely, Bonner and Newell (2008) showed that the per year 
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format resulted in higher perceptions of the risk of cancer. Gourville (1998) showed that 
pennies-a-day framing reduced the magnitude of the financial commitment relative to a 
per year framing. Although the study also explored monthly frames, the authors 
acknowledged additional research was necessary to determine when particular frames are 
more effective based on consumers’ familiarity of the frame (e.g., rent per month). 
Ülkümen, Thomas, and Morwitz (2008) found temporal effects with budgeting as 
consumers’ budgets were lower than expenses when framed in terms of the next month 
but much closer to expenses when framed in terms of the next year. There is additional 
opportunity to study temporal units to determine the point at which processing switches 
from low level construal or concrete to high level construal or abstract (Trope and 
Liberman 2003). 
The previously mentioned studies focus on individual unit framing such as “per 
day” or “per year,” but what about framing that not only involves multiple temporal units 
but also incorporates numbers? For example, “hours per day” incorporate two different 
temporal units and also provides a mathematical limit of 24 hours in a day for an 
individual. In a sustainability example, energy usage (or savings) could be framed as 
hours per day, hours per week, hours per year, or days per year. “The LED bulb saves 1 
hour worth of energy per day.” versus “The LED bulb saves 365 hours of energy per 
year.” Combining multiple temporal units puts mathematical constraints on what the 
consumer is able to perceive (e.g., maximum of 24 hours in a day) while also combining 
two different units (e.g., hours and days). Given a recent call for classification of units 
(Monga and Bagchi 2012), there is plenty of opportunity for additional research looking 
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at qualitative components of numerical frames, with markedness offering a unique lens to 
analyze the linguistic makeup of the frame. 
 
Related Theoretical Areas 
 
There are a number of other potential theories that may tie into the interaction of 
anchoring and markedness.  From processing systems (Kahneman 2003) to scarcity 
(Cialdini 1993), additional points of consideration are discussed below. 
 
Fluency and Processing 
 
In dual system processing (e.g., Kahneman, 2003, 2011), System 1 processes are 
described as fast, automatic and effortless while System 2 processes are more deliberate, 
effortful and controlled. In other words, System 1 works with perception and intuition 
while System 2 handles reasoning. Based on conversational norms (Grice 1975), it is 
possible that marked terms activate a more thorough processing of the information 
(System 2) given they are not as conversationally common. For example, “How short is 
the man?” is not a typical conversation manner in which to ask about a person’s height. 
By asking a question in a marked manner or using a marked adjective, it may cue a 
different level of processing. Conversely, using unmarked terms may be quickly 
processed by System 1 because they are more common in everyday communication. 
Recently, Schuldt, Muller, and Schwarz (2012) showed that package labeling (e.g., 
fair trade) effects perceptions of calorie content in the food. The authors call for 
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additional research on how and when heuristic or systematic processing is utilized in 
evaluating these types of linguistic descriptions with food decisions. Markedness may 
offer one categorization system or prediction theory for when particular systems are 
active.  For example, the term vegetable is unmarked as that is how consumers 
customarily refer to it, in contrast to organic vegetable, which is the marked term given 
the organic nature of a vegetable is not assumed and thus it provides additional 
information. What happens when vegetable becomes an unmarked term (and organic is 
assumed) and non-organic becomes the marked term? A similar argument can be made 
for genetically modified organisms (GMO) products. Currently non-GMO is a marked 
term given that it provides additional information beyond the default, but at some point 
the term may switch to where non-GMO is assumed and GMO becomes the marked term. 
At a broad level, what are the best marketing practices for marked versus unmarked 
terms? A markedness approach may yield a host of broader marketing research questions 
based on differences in linguistics and conversation cues. 
 
Scarcity 
 
Scarcity represents a very interesting theory to study in the realm of quantitative 
judgment. In anchoring, the numerical value is explicitly stated (i.e., a crowd of 700), but 
with a marked or unmarked adjective the numerical value is not explicitly stated (i.e., a 
big crowd) and thus is inferred by the individual. According to the scarcity principle 
(Cialdini 1993), opportunities seem more valuable when they appear more limited, and 
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scarcity techniques predominantly fall into two categories in marketing: limited quantity 
and limited time.  
Limited Quantity. Limited-quantity scarcity appeals effect purchase intention to a 
greater extent than limited-time scarcity appeals (Aggarwal, Jun, and Huh 2011). Limited 
edition is a type of limited quantity appeal and has been modeled to show a positive 
effect on brand profits but a negative strategy effect by increasing price competition 
(Balachander and Stock 2009). In addition, scarcity restrictions can improve perceptions 
of a deal (Inman, Peter, and Raghubir 1997). The studies focus on quantity limits in the 
numerical sense, however, and don’t systematically explore quantities in the qualitative 
sense (i.e., markedness) beyond the word limited nor the potential interaction between the 
two. For example, stating “only a few left” versus “only 3 left” may effect perceptions of 
quantity-based scarcity. 
In a sports marketing example, Wann, Bayens, and Driver (2004) showed 
respondents a scenario at an arena that seats 20,000 people and told participants that 
either 25 tickets remain (scarce condition) or 2,000 tickets remain (not scarce condition). 
In support of commodity theory (Lynn 1991), which states that scarcity enhances 
desirability and value, there was a significant difference in likelihood of attending the 
event.  One could argue both conditions are considered scarce, and 25 tickets remaining 
represents a more extreme form of scarcity. Furthermore, how would the results be 
different if many versus few tickets were available or the arena was expecting a big 
versus small crowd? Based on fuzzy-trace theory, perhaps 25 tickets remaining is 
encoded as very few while 2,000 tickets, as few and thus the effect could be qualitative in 
nature as well. 
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Limited Time. In an analysis of newspaper retail advertisements, Howard and 
Kerin (2006) showed the that 87.2% of ads that included a reference price (e.g. “Was 
$___. Now $__”) also include reference to limited time scarcity (e.g. “Three days left.”). 
This pattern potentially has implications for anchoring with multiple numbers in addition 
to markedness based on the words and phrases used in the retail advertisements. The 
authors also suggest that future search should look at other variables that could magnify 
the effects, which has implications for this dissertation research. As Spears (2001) notes, 
time pressure can be explicit (“3 days only”) or implicit (“limited time only”). Although 
not discussed in the article, this type of comparison has strong ties to anchoring (explicit 
scarcity) and markedness of adjectives (implicit scarcity).  
 
Numeracy 
 
Numeracy, defined as “how facile people are with basic probability and 
mathematical concepts,” (Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer 2001) is an important consideration 
when looking at anchoring given the perception of numbers, ratios and percentages that 
are often involved. There are a variety of numeracy tests ranging from the Berlin 
Numeracy Test (Cokely, Galesic, and Schulz 2012), which emphasizes statistical 
numeracy, to numeracy tests that have been shown to be particularly applicable to 
judgment and decision making tasks (Peters, Västfjäll, and Slovic 2006). For example, 
Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, and Welch (1997) showed that numeracy was strongly 
related to understanding the benefits of mammography. 
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Research on individual difference variables, such as openness to experiences 
(McElroy and Dowd 2007), suggests that individual differences could effect quantitative 
judgments such as anchoring. For example, when an individual considers an estimate 
(e.g., height of a redwood tree), the difference between an individual’s reference point 
and the presented anchor represents a ratio similar to the anchoring index described by 
Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995): anchoring index = median (high anchor) – median (low 
anchor) / high anchor – low anchor. Although this equation is used to assess the power 
of an anchor across multiple respondents, an individual potentially makes a similar type 
of numerical comparison (reference point / anchor) in deciding the plausibility of an 
estimate. Thus, an individual’s ability, or lack thereof, to consider mathematical relations 
on the fly, in addition to their comfort with numbers, may have implications for 
understanding of linguistics cues such as big, which require numerical interpretation. 
Similarly, there are likely additional implications when the scenario involves units given 
the potential need to convert between units. For example, consider being a scenario 
framed in minutes but making a judgment based on hours. 
In addition, the numeracy literature largely focuses on actual numbers. Lipkus and 
colleagues' (2001) definition of numeracy, however, could be applied to how facile 
people are with numerical expressions of a qualitative nature rather than purely 
quantitative information. For example, independent of knowledge, some people may 
allocate a wider range to big than small. This allocation is in line with the markedness 
literature, but markedness is a linguistic effect, not an individual difference variable that 
is measured in terms of comfort level with a variety of different adjective or linguistic 
structures.  
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Latitude of Acceptance 
 
 Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif (1957) suggest that latitude of acceptance is the 
range of acceptable answers that not only includes the individual’s stance but also that of 
other acceptance positions. For example, a citizen who is a Democrat may be willing to 
accept (i.e., latitude of acceptance) ideas that have aspects of Republican ideals but may 
reject (i.e., latitude of rejection) ideas that stray too far to the Republican side. 
The latitude of acceptance theory was recently adopted by Simonson, Bettman, 
Kramer, and Payne (2013) as a means to explain comparisons in judgment and decision 
making tasks. The authors describe latitude of acceptance as “the range and concentration 
of task-acceptable comparisons” (p. 140), which is similar in nature to the original 
definition but emphasizes comparison. Strack and Mussweiler (2000) designed a study 
using plausible versus implausible anchors to show the diminishing returns of anchoring 
beyond a plausible limit. Although they term the range of the anchor as implausible or 
plausible, one other explanation based on literature may be latitude of acceptance. 
Social cues may potentially play a role in the intersection of anchoring, linguistics 
and latitude of acceptance. Consider the following example: 
 
One agency suggests Americans recycle 10 [or 100] tons of cans per year.  How 
many [few] tons of cans do you think Americans recycle per year? 
 
One could argue the high anchor is more powerful because it is a more socially 
desirable outcome (Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius 2008), in addition to aligning 
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with self-interests (i.e., people should recycle). Thus, people may be more swayed by 
both the numerical and qualitative anchor in the direction of self-interest or social norms. 
In terms of latitude of acceptance, social norms and self-interest may shift the range of 
the latitude acceptance. A person who recycles often may be more inclined to believe 
higher values of recycling numbers by the average American than somebody who does 
not.  
 McElroy and Dowd (2007) showed that respondents high on the Big-Five 
personality trait openness to experience were more susceptible to anchoring effects. The 
argument is that people who are high on openness to experience are more likely to adjust 
behaviors and beliefs, which, in an anchoring scenario, means they are more susceptible 
to then initial number provided. Although still needing empirical testing, a person with 
openness to experience may respond in a similar way to someone who is presented with 
an anchor inside his or her latitude of acceptance.  
In addition, the range of the latitude of acceptance for small may be smaller than 
the range of big.  For example, for a stadium that holds 10,000 fans a big crowd may be 
perceived to range from 5,000 to 10,000, but a small crowd may only range from 3,000 to 
5,000. In other words, the latitude of acceptance of a big crowd is much wider than that 
of a small crowd. Thus, conversational cues (e. g., big vs. small) for numerical judgments 
may potentially be constrained by a person’s latitude of acceptance.  
 
Conclusion !
 This literature review explores a variety of contexts and theories that have 
implications for numerical judgments and are intertwined with the markedness approach 
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to the research conducted in this dissertation. Although anchoring has largely focused on 
quantitative effects and markedness has largely focused on qualitative effects, this 
literature review illustrates the overlapping characteristics of a variety of qualitative and 
quantitative theories. Numerical perceptions go beyond a number to include processing 
theories such as fuzzy trace theory, profile theories such as argumentative orientation, 
and markedness theories of language in terms of how people encode and store numerical 
information. This literature review opens the door for a better understanding of non-
numeric cues that effect judgment and decision making while making a case to 
empirically test these ideas in Chapter III.  
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CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 
 
Overview 
 
As the role of conversational norms and information leakage gains traction in the 
marketing literature, effects of numerical expressions may be explored in exciting new 
ways. A linguistics-based approach, emphasizing markedness theory, yields several 
interesting research questions: 
 
• How do qualitative cues (marked and unmarked adjectives) effect numerical 
estimates? 
• How do qualitative cues (marked and unmarked adjectives) interact with other 
cues (numbers, etc.)? 
 
Literature on anchoring effects largely focuses on quantitative estimation.  
Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995, p. 1161) state, “An anchor is an arbitrary value that the 
subject is caused to consider before making a numerical estimate.” By value, however, 
the authors are referencing a number.  One could twist that definition to reflect the efforts 
in this research to incorporate words before making a numerical judgment.   
 The initial inspiration for a deeper look into linguistic effects on quantitative 
expressions and numerical processing was based on Harris' (1973) article, “Answering 
questions containing marked and unmarked adjectives and adverbs.” The article, which 
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appears to be grossly under-cited given its potential influence, is interesting for two 
primary reasons. First, the article looks at quantitative expressions such as big and little to 
illustrate that using one or the other (i.e., a frame or an anchor) results in different 
numerical estimations. Second, and more profound from a theoretical perspective, the 
article presents new interpretation of numerical judgments based on the concept of 
marked and unmarked adjectives. 
 Harris (1973) added a numerical component to the discussion of marked and 
unmarked adjectives by measuring respondents’ estimates to a variety of questions based 
on the unmarked or marked version of an adjective. For example, consider the two 
questions: 
 
(A) How old is the man’s car? 
(B) How new is the man’s car? 
 
Participants who responded to the old framing (A) estimated the car's age was 
5.46 years, but those respondents who saw the new framing (B) estimated the car's age 
was only 2.04 years. The author tested a variety of other scenarios including time 
between planes, width of a street, and age of a grandmother. The author also tested how 
big or little “the crowd at the football game" was, but the difference was not significant. 
Although the study suggests the power of words, and generally supports the unmarked 
versus marked adjective discussion, it did not measure any neutral framing of questions. 
Some linguistic researchers argue there is no such thing as a neutral frame. For example, 
Clark and Schober (1992) claim: 
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It is futile to search for truly neutral questions. They don’t exist. Every question 
carries presuppositions, so every question establishes a perspective. 
 
While discussing that statement could generate its own line of research and 
generate significant disruption in marketing research, neutral frames have been used in 
markedness studies to reflect the unit or number in question. For example, age is the 
ultimate goal of asking how old (2A) or how new (2B) something is. Therefore, a neutral 
frame would be: 
 
(2C): What is the age of the man’s car? 
 
The neutral framing asks for the same information (age) but does it without using 
a qualifying adjective such as new or old. Thus, it is an important absence from Harris's 
(1973) work as markedness suggests people respond to the unmarked adjective (old) 
similar to the neutral question.  
 McKenzie and Nelson (2003) argue that frame selection serves an efficient 
communicative function by reliably conveying implicit information in addition to explicit 
information. For example, Levin and Gaeth (1988) showed that consumers responded 
more favorably to beef framed as “75% lean” than “25% fat.” Although traditional views 
of framing suggest the frames are equivalent, McKenzie and Nelson (2003) argue that the 
frame has a function beyond the outwardly present information. A consumer may infer in 
the “25% fat” frame that ground beef typically has less fat and thus “25% fat” is not that 
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appealing. Said another way, “logically equivalent descriptions, or frames, in inference 
tasks leak normatively relevant information about event rarity” (McKenzie, 2004, p. 883). 
The frame may effect the consumer’s reference point in a matter that is not apparent in 
the explicit information, but it still influences the consumer's response. This research 
highlights the importance of better understanding linguistics cues in judgment and 
decision making tasks. 
 McKenzie, Liersch, and Finkelstein (2006) explored the popular Johnson and 
Goldstein (2003) default option study, which showed that countries with an opt-out form 
had significantly more citizens consenting to donate their organs than countries with opt-
in forms. McKenzie and colleagues (2006) showed that policy makers’ attitudes are 
leaked based on the frame they choose, and people assume the default framing is the 
recommended response. Linguistic cues in the answer options may be responsible for 
previous effects attributed to numerical anchors and framing as well (Frederick and 
Mochon 2012). Given that the marketing literature recently began to emphasize language 
and conversation cues, investigating numerical priming through a linguistics approach 
may help differentiate between effects caused by a numerical anchor and ones caused by 
linguistics or markedness cues.  
The previous discussion falls in line with more recent discussions of suggested 
and or leaked information. For example, Kayne (2007, p. 832) states: 
 
There is more to syntax than meets the eye is clear. One important way in which 
this holds involves the presence of elements that are syntactically and 
interpretively active, but yet not pronounced. 
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Furthermore, Kayne (2007) shows that words such as several, few and many are 
modifiers of the unpronounced number. Consider the following two examples discussed 
by the author: 
 
(A) John has too few friends. 
(B) John has too small a number of friends. 
 
The sentences are similar in intent but different in linguistic structure, which may 
effect interpretation. The word few (A) arguably modifies the unmentioned number which 
is more explicit in (B). This type of example shows, similar to information leakage, that 
sentences that seem equivalent may be logically equivalent but are not informationally 
equivalent. 
Tying the findings to a study on adjectives (e.g., Harris, 1973), asking, “How 
small is the crowd?” may suggest that the crowd is typically smaller. Given big is an 
unmarked adjective, however, asking “How big is the crowd?” may not effect the 
reference point because it is seen as conversationally equivalent to, “What is the size of 
the crowd?”  From an anchoring perspective, the respondents may anchor down from 
their reference point in the “How small is the crowd?” condition, but the reference point 
remains unchanged in the “How big is the crowd?” example as it is not suggestive of the 
magnitude of the quantity. To further complicate judgment and processing, adding 
numerical anchors may have different effects based on the use of marked and unmarked 
adjectives. Although some may not be conversationally normal, asking, “Is the crowd 
[smaller/bigger] than [30,000/2,000]?” may result in some interesting anchoring effects 
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given the relation between markedness and numerical anchoring.  Several studies are 
conducted to further understand linguistic cues in quantitative expressions. 
 
Study 1: Markedness + Google Trends 
 
The purpose of study 1 is to identify frequency of adjective use due to its 
association with markedness.  One general principle of markedness is that unmarked 
terms can be used in more contexts and thus are seen more frequently (Greenberg 2005). 
A modern way to test this hypothesis is by using Google Trends. Google Trends data 
have been used to predict disease outbreak (Polgreen et al. 2008; Carneiro and Mylonakis 
2009), economic indicators (Choi and Varian 2012), and as a proxy for interest in product 
categories (Moe and Schweidel 2012). Thus, it represents a formidable method, and the 
first to use Google Trends, to analyze the frequency and popularity of various marked 
and unmarked pairs. Based on the previous discussion of markedness the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: The unmarked term will appear significantly more often in searches than the 
marked term. 
 
Method 
 
 Study 1 uses Google Trends data to determine how often given marked and 
unmarked terms of searched. Each pair of marked and unmarked terms was searched in 
Google Trends for the result index score of search volume. The Google Trends site 
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describes each number as “represent[ing] search volume relative to the highest point on 
the chart, which is always 100.” For example, much and little, used in the Harris (1973) 
study as well, were input to provide an index score for those specific terms on Google. 
Several terms such as frequently and infrequently did not have enough search volume to 
allow Google Trends to provide an index. Thus, they were left out of the analysis and 
only markedness pairs that Google Trends provided results for, shown in table 2, were 
included in the analysis. 
 
Results 
 
Table 2 shows the Google Trends analysis of common markedness comparisons. 
An ANOVA was run for each marked and unmarked comparison. The sample of 489 
represents an index score for each week of searches from January 2004 until May 2013. 
In summary, the unmarked term was searched more frequently in six of the eight 
comparisons. Furthermore, if the results are collapsed across all adjective pairs, the 
unmarked adjective (M = 61.76) is searched more frequently than the marked adjective 
(M = 33.94), F(1,977) = 5765.13, p < .001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !
47 
 
Table 2. Frequency of marked and unmarked searches on Google (study 1) 
Adjective Markedness Mean SD N F df Sig. 
Much Unmarked 49.8 23.5 489 305.68 1 p < .001 
Little Marked 69.6 8.9 
High Unmarked 74.7 8.7 
489 19790.92 1 p < .001 Low Marked 17.9 1.8 
Hot Unmarked 64.8 13.5 489 7836.85 1 p < .001 Cold Marked 10.2 1.4 
Wide Unmarked 71.8 8.9 489 23597.82 1 p < .001 Narrow Marked 9.3 1.1 
Old Unmarked 72.5 9.9 489 3764.07 1 p < .001 Young Marked 42.9 4.1 
Long Unmarked 65.3 14.4 489 4023.44 1 p < .001 
Short Marked 23.5 2.2 
Tall Unmarked 20.7 4.3 489 23057.48 1 p < .001 
Short Marked 80.5 7.6 
Big Unmarked 74.5 7.9 
489 24291.86 1 p < .001 Small Marked 17.6 1.7 
 
Discussion 
 
Study 1 utilizes a modern method to study the frequency assumption consistent 
with markedness research. Furthermore, it begins to bring the markedness theory into a 
marketing and consumer behavior context (using Google as a search engine). It should be 
noted that the data may have noise and thus represent a broad look at the frequency of 
search terms. For example, Old Navy appears in search terms for old while Neil Young 
appears in searches for young. Comparisons were conducted without popular terms (e. g., 
Old Navy, Neil Young, High School) and the general conclusions did not deviate from 
table 2. Thus, marked and unmarked terms, in a broad sense, are shown in table 2 and 
confirm suggestions in past articles (Greenberg 2005) that unmarked terms can be used in 
more contexts and more frequently than marked terms, thereby supporting hypothesis 1.  
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Study 2: Markedness + Quantitative Estimates !
This study is inspired by Harris (1973) but expands on it to make the findings 
clearer. First, the questions in the article were hypothetical in nature with no specific 
context. For example, “How tall is the basketball player?” was not in reference to any 
specific basketball player but a general assessment. Similarly “How little was the crowd 
at the football game” was not clear, nor statistically significant in their study, and thus 
worthy of further exploration. Respondents were simply told that the “experiment was a 
study in the accuracy of guessing measurements and that they should make as intelligent 
a numerical guess as possible to each question,” (Harris, 1973, p. 401), yet the object and 
context of the estimations were unclear.  
Second, the purpose of the study was to distinguish between marked and 
unmarked adjectives, but it did not substantially explore Clark's (1969) claim that 
unmarked adjectives have two senses, measurement and magnitude. Although Harris' 
(1973) study established that asking questions such as “How [high/low] was the plane 
flying?” resulted in different answers, it did not ask neutral questions such as “At what 
height was the plane flying?” Granted, markedness theory suggests that the unmarked 
term acts as a neutral term (Battistella 1996), and thus would constitute a neutral question 
in itself, asking a question without a directional adjective will help support the general 
discussion. Kallio and Cutler (1987) asked a neutral question, but the study was an 
eyewitness memory application.  The authors found no main effects in the study with a 
marked, unmarked and neutral condition. Adding a neutral question into the study design 
could contribute to markedness theory by showing how questions without an adjective 
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suggesting magnitude differ from traditional marked and unmarked terms, which include 
a form of magnitude (e. g., big and small).  
Third, a question such as “How [tall/short] is the man?” is an interesting question 
but potentially has fewer marketing applications than questions like “How [big/small] 
was the crowd at the football game?” “How [many/few] watts of energy are saved by 
using a LED light bulb?” or “How [much/little] meat is consumed by the average 
American?” In a real world context, sports organizations often try to manage crowd 
expectations by indicating the expected size of a crowd based on qualitative cues (big or 
small) or quantitative cues (actual attendance number). Similarly, testing the markedness 
theory in a scenario with marketing-based applications will illustrate its power in a 
business context.  
Fourth, few studies, particularly in marketing literature, have associated numbers 
with linguistics in any systematic or categorical fashion. Although willingness to pay 
(Krishna 1991) is a reasonable dependent variable for this type of approach, the majority 
of the literature has not looked at marketing through the lens of markedness or 
conversational cues. Recently, Monga and Bagchi (2012) and Zhang and Schwarz (2013) 
have called for increased attention to qualitative cues in framing that may effect how 
information is interpreted. From a theoretical perspective, this finding has potential 
implications for anchoring (Jacowitz and Kahneman 1995) and markedness (Battistella 
1990, 1996), in addition to other theories such as those on processing (Kahneman 2003) 
and persuasion (Cialdini 1993; Friestad and Wright 1994; Boush, Friestad, and Wright 
2009). 
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Subsequent studies, referencing marked and unmarked adverbs, have shown that 
varying the adverb (fast or slow) can have significant effects on estimates of the speed of 
the crash as well (Lipscomb, McAllister, and Bregman 1985). Neither study uses a 
baseline or neutral condition to gauge whether the unmarked adverb or verb is 
significantly different from a neutral framing of the question. For example, respondents 
could be asked, “What was the miles per hour of Car 1?” or another similarly framed 
question that attempts to remove leading information. The power of marked and 
unmarked framing is important to establish theoretically as it suggests a more 
complicated relation between the linguistics literature and the marketing literature.  
In addition, several of the studies focus on eyewitness testimony or memory and 
thus could benefit from further justification in a marketing context. Given the breadth of 
languages and perspectives on linguistics, there are a variety of opinions on markedness, 
(see Evans and Levinson, 2009; Haspelmath, 2006a; Levinson and Evans, 2010 for other 
perspectives), much like many social psychology theories, but it does present an 
interesting lens through which to look at framing in a marketing context. Based on the 
previous literature review of markedness, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H2A: The marked adjective frame will result in significantly lower estimates than 
the unmarked adjective frame.  
H2B:  The marked adjective frame will result in significantly lower numerical 
estimates than the neutral frame. 
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Method 
 
One hundred and forty eight adults (71% male; Mage = 31 years) participated via 
Amazon mTurk which has been shown to be a reliable substitute for student subjects 
(Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010; Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011). 
Respondents were asked to provide an estimate of crowd size and were randomly 
assigned to one of three conditions (unmarked adjective, marked adjective, or 
control/neutral condition). Specifically, respondents were randomly assigned to the 
question “How [big/small] is the average crowd at a college football game?” In the 
neutral condition, respondents were asked: “What is the size of the average crowd at a 
college football game?” Subsequently, all participants were asked knowledge questions 
including “I am knowledgeable about college football.” “I frequently watch college 
football games.”, and “I frequently attend college football games.” with responses on a 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Finally, response time was 
measured to determine whether markedness effects processing time, which builds on a 
literature looking at processing time (c.f., Viswanathan and Narayanan, 1994) based on 
numerical and verbal pairs.  
 
Results 
 
Numerical Estimate. A one-way analysis of variance revealed a main effect of 
markedness, F(2,147) = 5.87, p = .004. Means and standard deviations are reported in 
table 3, and figure 1 visually presents the information. Post-hoc tests confirm that the 
unmarked frame (M = 26,887) is significantly different than the marked frame (M = 
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11,452), p = .003. The neutral frame (M = 22,111) was not significantly different than the 
marked frame (M = 11,452), although it was marginally directionally significant, p = .061. 
Finally, the unmarked frame (M = 26,887) was not significantly different than the neutral 
frame (M = 22,111), p = .562.   
 
 
Table 3. Estimates of crowd size by condition (study 2) 
  Mean  SD N 
Unmarked (Big) 26,887 27,480 50 
Marked (Small) 11,452 15,144 50 
Neutral 22,111 24,752 48 
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Figure 1. Effects of markedness on  
estimates of attendance at a college football game (study 2) 
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Response Time. Given the differences in sentence length with the neutral 
condition, only the unmarked frame and marked frame were compared in response time 
analysis. There was no main effect of markedness, F(1,100) = 0.28, p = .601) as the 
unmarked frame (M = 11.87) was not significantly different than the marked frame (M = 
12.98). See table 4 for means and standard deviations. 
 
 
Table 4. Response time by condition (study 2) 
  Mean  SD N 
Unmarked 26,887 27,480 50 
Marked 11,452 15,144 50 
Neutral 22,111 24,752 48 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The results show that marked and unmarked adjectives result in different 
numerical estimations, thereby supporting hypothesis 2a. Hypothesis 2b was not 
supported, however, as the neutral frame and marked frame did not result in significantly 
different numerical estimates. The results from this study illustrate that a marked term 
such as small effects numerical estimates differently than unmarked terms such as big. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that there is no difference between unmarked (such as 
big) framing and a neutral framing, which empirically supports conceptual suggestions in 
markedness theory (c.f., Clark, 1969; Lehrer, 1985). 
Although there was no significant difference in response time, it remains an 
interesting variable worthy of future exploration. As Huttenlocher, Higgins, and Clark 
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(1971) suggest, the extreme lower bound of a marked adjective is zero. In terms of 
computational processing, this fact suggests the marked adjective focuses judgment to a 
smaller range of plausible answers; thus, a quicker response may occur. Conversely, the 
marked term is less common, as shown in study 1, and thus may take longer to process. 
Results from study 2 suggest that markedness does not effect response time but it is 
examined further in study 3. 
 
Study 3: Markedness + Numerical Anchoring 
 
Study 3 expands on study 2 by including numerical anchors as another condition 
in the experimental design. In study 1, respondents were presented with a question with 
either an unmarked (big), marked (small), or neutral frame. Study 2 showed that 
unmarked terms resulted in significantly higher numerical estimates of attendance than 
marked terms. This study introduces numerical anchors to test potential interactions with 
marked and unmarked terms. Given that the power of numerical anchors has long been 
established (e. g., Jacowitz and Kahneman, 1995; Mussweiler and Strack, 2000; Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974), this study examines how these numerical anchors interact with 
marked and unmarked expressions (e.g., big and small). Study 3 is the first study to 
combine anchoring and markedness theories which, given the potential of each to 
individually effect numerical perceptions, advances theory by exploring the interplay 
between the two. It is expected that in the presence of both high and low anchors, 
markedness effects will still occur. 
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H3: The marked adjective frame will result in significantly lower estimates of 
attendance than the unmarked adjective frame in the high and low anchor 
conditions. 
 
Method 
 
Three hundred and twenty four adults (70% male; Mage = 30 years) participated 
via Amazon mTurk in exchange for monetary compensation. Study 3 used a 3 (Adjective: 
Marked vs. Unmarked vs. Neutral) by 2 (Numerical Anchor: High vs. Low) between-
subjects design. Respondents were presented with the same questions as in study 2 in a 
random order, but numerical anchors were added. In order to incorporate the anchor, a 
preliminary statement referenced an estimate from another person. For example, 
respondents saw a variation of the following question depending on the condition they 
were randomly assigned to: 
 
One person estimates the average crowd at a college football game is [40,000/4,000] 
people. How [big/small] is the average crowd at a college football game? 
 
Similar to study 2, an answer space was provided for each respondent to indicate 
his or her answer.  Response time was measured as well to determine whether the 
condition effects processing time. In addition, knowledge about college football and 
demographics were asked in order to control for these as covariates. Finally, response 
time was measured to determine whether markedness effects processing time.  
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Results 
 
Numerical Estimate. There was a main effect of markedness, F(2,323) = 4.71, p 
= .010, and a main effect of anchoring, F(1,323) = 29.06, p = .000, on numerical 
estimates of crowd size but no significant interaction, F(2, 323) = 0.82, p = .443. 
Respondents in the marked condition (M = 11,708) had significantly smaller estimates of 
crowd size than those respondents in the neutral condition (M = 19,106), p = .009. 
Interestingly, there was no significant difference between estimates in the unmarked 
condition (M = 15,110) and marked condition (M = 11,708), p = .375, although mean 
differences follow expectations. Finally, there was no significant difference, as expected, 
between the unmarked condition (M = 15,110) and the neutral condition (M = 19,106), p 
= .236. Respondents in the high anchor condition (M = 20,610) estimated a significantly 
larger crowd size than those in the low anchor condition (M = 10,006), p = .000. Table 5 
includes the means and standard deviations, and figure 2 visually illustrates the results.  
 
 
Table 5. Estimates of crowd size by condition (study 3) 
  High Anchor   Low Anchor 
  N Mean  Std. Dev.   N Mean  Std. Dev. 
Unmarked 55 18,834 18,868  54 11,386 14,833 
Marked 55 17,106 19,357  51 6,309 9,541 
Neutral 54 25,889 22,310  55 12,322 18,033  
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Response Time. Given the variation in word count and word meaning associated 
with neutral conditions, analysis of the processing time was restricted to a 2 (markedness: 
marked vs. unmarked) by 2 (numerical anchor: high vs. low) analysis. Means and 
standard deviations are included in table 6. There was no main effect for markedness 
F(1,214) = .001, p  = .977), no main effect for anchor F(1,214) = .037, p = .848), nor a 
significant interaction F(1,214) = 1.287, p = .258).  
 
 Table 6. Response Time (seconds) By Condition 
(study 3) 
  N Mean  Std. Error 
Unmarked 91 18.75 1.06 
Marked 84 23 1.09 
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Discussion 
 
Study 3 resulted in some interesting findings regarding numerical estimates. 
Contrary to study 2, there was no significant difference between the unmarked condition 
and the marked condition, thereby failing to support hypotheses 3.  Although the results 
were directionally as anticipated, the lack of significant differences suggest the numerical 
information may overpower linguistic cues and/or alter the interpretation of the linguistic 
cues in a meaningful way.  
As discussed, and arguably most profound, it appears that the mere presence of a 
number effects markedness. The neutral markedness condition resulted in the highest 
estimates of crowd size, which goes against the findings in study 2. Two possible 
theoretical explanations that are worth further exploration are the Persuasion Knowledge 
Model (Friestad and Wright 1994; Boush et al. 2009) and the Elaboration Likelihood 
Model (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Although we need additional experimental support, 
past literature has shown reactance to persuasion attempts (Fitzsimons and Lehmann 
2004; Laran, Dalton, and Andrade 2011). In study 3, it is possible the respondents 
recognized a persuasion attempt when a qualitative cue (big or small) was partnered with 
a quantitative cue (40,000 or 4,000) and thus reacted with smaller crowd size estimates.  
Study 3 challenges markedness theory as well by suggesting unmarked, marked and 
neutral terms do not behave in the same way in the presence of a number.  In study 2, 
with no anchors, there was a significant difference between the unmarked and marked 
condition; however, study 3 shows how the presence of numerical anchors effects 
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markedness as there was no significant difference between the unmarked and marked 
condition. 
In addition, study 3 hints at other phenomena that may be worth exploring further 
in future studies. The difference between a marked and unmarked word seems to be 
different when a high number is present than when a low number is present. In the high 
anchor condition, the difference between estimates in the marked and unmarked 
condition was 1,727, but in the low anchor condition, the difference between the marked 
and unmarked estimates was 5,076. These findings represent an intriguing option for 
further study and may suggest that a numerical anchor effects the interpretation of other 
descriptive information (e.g., the marked or unmarked term) within the sentence.   
Finally, study 3 (with numerical anchors) showed that there was no significant 
difference in response time between the unmarked and marked conditions, which 
confirms the findings from study 2. This result appears to rule out any fluency issues 
associated with markedness as response time is generally an indicator of fluency. A more 
information-based processing theory, such as fuzzy trace theory (Reyna and Brainerd, 
1991) may be a better explanation to focus on moving forward given its emphasis on gist 
(generally word associations) versus verbatim (generally numbers based) processing 
styles. Although numerical pairs have been shown to result in quicker processing time 
than verbal pairs or numerical/verbal pairs (Viswanathan and Narayanan 1994), this past 
research is not supported by study 3. Nonetheless, response time remains an intriguing 
area of study given the lack of response time metrics associated with markedness, in 
addition to better understanding the processing mechanisms behind the numerical 
estimate effects.  
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Study 4: Markedness + Range  
 
Study 4 expands on the previous studies by exploring the numerical range of 
marked and unmarked words. As Harris (1973) and others have noted, a marked term has 
a lower bound of zero while an unmarked term has an indefinite upward bound. As such, 
this potentially has interesting effects on the range of plausible answers to a scenario. 
Take the following scenarios for example: 
 
(4A) The crowd was big. 
(4B) The crowd was small. 
 
 As previously shown, the use of unmarked versus marked terms can result in 
significantly different numerical estimates of the size of the crowd. One additional 
question is whether markedness effects the range of possible numerical estimates, 
Inspired by Cummins (2011), study 4 explores the range of values the respondent would 
consider based on a  “From _________ to _______. Most likely _____.” One argument is 
that the range should make no difference as a respondent that is told a crowd is small 
could easily estimate values from 5,000 to 20,000 (difference of 15,000) while a 
respondent that is told a crowd is big could estimate values from 25,000 to 40,000 
(difference of 15,000). Thus, the range of the values that are considered are the same 
regardless of the frame. Given the markedness effects already explored, it is expected that 
markedness will not only influence the mean estimate but also the range of values the 
respondent considers. Therefore: 
 !
61 
H4: The unmarked frame will result in a significantly larger range of values than 
the marked frame. 
 
Method 
 
One hundred and thirteen adults (60% male; Mage = 35 years) participated via 
Amazon mTurk. Study 4 used a 2-way (Markedness: Marked vs. Unmarked) between-
subjects design. Respondents were presented with the following scenario in which an 
unmarked term (big) or a marked term (small) were used depending on the condition the 
respondent was randomly assigned: 
 
Imagine you are talking with a friend about a Major League Baseball game he recently 
attended. While talking about the attendance at the game, your friend says: 
 
“It was a [big/small] crowd.” 
  
Please indicate the number of people you think were in the stadium using the following 
format: From ______________ to ______________  but most likely ______________.  
 
Similar to the previous studies, answer spaces were provided for each respondent 
to indicate his or her answer.  Response time was measured as well to determine whether 
the condition effects processing time. In addition, knowledge about Major League 
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Baseball and demographics were asked in order to control for these as covariates. Finally, 
response time was measured to determine whether markedness effects processing time.  
 
Results 
 
There was a main effect of markedness on the from estimate F(1,112) = 14.40, 
p = .000; to estimate, F(1,112) = 12.28, p = .001; and most likely estimate 
F(1,112) = .000, p < .01. The range of estimates was calculated by subtracting the to 
estimate (the higher value) by the from estimate (the lower value). Subsequently, there 
was a significant main effect on the range of numerical estimates, F(1,112) = 4.32, 
p = .040. The marked term (i.e., small) resulted in a significantly narrower range of 
estimates (M = 6,219) than the unmarked term (M = 9,538). Finally, there was no 
significant effect of markedness on response time, F(1,112) = .118, p = .732; see figure 3 
and table 7 for a summary of these results. 
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 Table 7. Estimates of crowd size by condition (study 4) 
    Unmarked Marked 
From 
Mean  14,173 5,679 
SD 15,307 7,097 
To 
Mean  23,712 11,898 
SD 22,006 12,689 
Most Likely 
Mean  18,778 7,864 
SD 18,774 8,238 
Range (From - To) 
Mean  9,538 6,219 
SD 9,632 7,195 
 
Discussion 
 
 Study 4 expands on the previous studies by showing that markedness not only 
results in differences in numerical estimates but also the range of plausible answers. 
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Respondents estimated a more narrow range of possibilities in the marked frame than in 
the unmarked frame. When respondents were told the crowd was big, the difference 
between their low estimate and high estimate was 9,538, but when they were told the 
crowd was small, the difference between the low estimate and high estimate was only 
6,219, thereby supporting hypothesis 4.  
 This study shows that markedness and framing not only effect a specific estimate 
(as shown in study 2 and study 3) but also the range of estimates a person considers in a 
judgment task. Although respondents provided a numerical estimate, the goal was to 
understand the range of considerations and how markedness plays a role. From a 
marketing perspective, this result potentially has implications for language use in 
situations in which a marketer wants the consumer to consider a smaller range of 
possibilities. A marketer may advertise a low price but inadvertently reduce the range of 
prices the consumer processes. As another example, an announcement of cold weather 
gear may restrict a consumer’s perceptions of the opportunity to wear the gear relative to 
warm weather gear. Although markedness is susceptible to differences in the context, the 
results from this study suggest that verbal cues not only influence strictly numerical 
estimates but also the range of estimates a consumer may consider.   
 
Study 5: Markedness  + Anchoring + Constraint/Scarcity 
 
In their study, Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) note, “An unexpected observation 
is that the effects of high and low anchors were not equally strong; the mean AI was .51 
for the high anchors and .40 for the low anchors.” Similarly, in his work on marked and 
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unmarked adjectives, Harris (1973) notes, “Many of the distributions had a lower bound 
of zero and an unlimited, or at least far more indefinite, upward bound.” Gretchen, 
Chapman, and Johnson (1994) showed that implausibly large anchors had a smaller effect 
than more reasonable anchors. From a markedness perspective, Tribushinina (2009) 
highlights the importance of zero as a lower bound on marked terms. As the authors note, 
the zero reference point can account for markedness asymmetry because a marked term 
such as short is bound by zero, but an unmarked term such as tall can range to infinity. In 
order to control for this artifact, an upper bound is incorporated to limit numerical 
estimates that range towards infinity in both anchoring and markedness cues. Given 
potential relations between explicit (“3 days only”) and implicit (“limited time only”) 
scarcity (Spears, 2001), it is hypothesized that implicit cues (i.e., markedness) generate a 
stronger sense of scarcity a subsequently willingness to pay (Cialdini 1993).  
H5A: The unmarked (marked) frame will result in significantly higher (lower) 
estimates of willingness to pay. 
H5B: The unmarked (marked) frame will result in significantly higher [lower] 
perceptions of scarcity than the high (low) anchor. 
 
Method 
 
Two hundred and sixty nine adults (66% male; Mage = 30 years) were recruited 
via Amazon’s mTurk to participate in the study. The study utilized a 3 (markedness: 
marked vs. unmarked vs. neutral) by 3 (numerical anchor: high vs. low vs. none) 
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between-subjects design in a mathematically constrained (i.e., scarce) scenario. 
Respondents saw a variation of the following scenario depending on condition: 
 
Imagine your favorite basketball team is playing at a nearby venue that seats 
10,000 people. The team releases the following statement: 
“We are expecting a [small/big/none] crowd of [2,000/8,000/none] people.” 
 
Dependent variables included estimates of attendance, willingness to pay for a 
ticket, purchase intention, likelihood of attending the event and perceptions of scarcity. 
The scarcity questions, based on Aguirre-Rodriguez (2013), included “Tickets to the 
game are in limited supply.” and “Tickets to the game are in high demand.” with 
responses on a Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).  The additional 
dependent variables were included in order to study the effects of anchoring and 
markedness in one modality (i.e., crowd size) on numerical judgments (i.e., willingness to 
pay) in another modality. Furthermore, the addition of willingness to pay as a dependent 
variable further strengthens the marketing applicability of the proposed research on 
markedness and anchoring theories. 
 
Results 
 
Given inconsistencies in phrasing associated with the no anchor and no adjective 
condition, the analysis was reduced to focus on a 3 (markedness: marked vs. unmarked vs. 
neutral) by 2 (numerical anchor: high vs. low) between-subjects design. There was a 
 !
67 
significant main effect of anchoring on expected attendance, F(1,183) = 575.91, p = .000, 
but no main effect of markedness, F(2,183) = .871, p = .420, nor any interaction effect 
F(2,183) = .635, p = .531. There was a significant main effect of the numerical anchor on 
willingness to pay (F(1,183) = 5.49, p = .020) but no significant main effect of 
markedness, F(2,183) = 1.16, p = .316, nor interaction effect F(2,183) = .658, p = .519. 
Scarcity. In spite of no effect of markedness on expected attendance or 
willingness to pay, there was a significant interaction effect between markedness and 
anchoring on perceived scarcity of tickets, F(2,177) = 4.92, p = .008. As shown in figure 
4, in the high anchor condition, the unmarked adjective resulted in significantly higher 
perceptions of scarcity (M = 4.34, SD = 1.22) than the marked condition (M = 3.33, SD = 
1.15), F(2,89) = 4.29, p = .017. There was no significant difference, however, between 
the unmarked condition and the neutral (no adjective) condition (p  = .500). In the low 
anchor condition, there was no significant effect of markedness, F(2,87) = 1.27, p = .287.  
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Discussion 
 
 The hypotheses for study 5 were generally not supported, and there are a variety 
of potential reasons why study 5 did not result in many meaningfully significant findings. 
As discussed, including a constraint reduces the amount of variance as all of the frames 
included an expected attendance combined with a capacity for the venue. Thus, 
respondents presumably had very high knowledge or awareness of the ticketing situation 
for the event. As such, there was no significant main effect of markedness on willingness 
to pay or estimates of attendance, thereby failing to support hypothesis 5a. 
 Another important distinction with study 5 is the source of the message. In terms 
of estimated attendance, the team provided explicit numerical information and, as a result, 
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the effect of the adjective cues (big and small) was mitigated. A quick review of the study 
shows that, when no numerical information is present, expecting a big crowd versus 
small crowd results in significant differences in attendance estimates and scarcity. Finally, 
the study raises an interesting question about the effect of the capacity constraint. The 
results would likely be different without a capacity because big versus small would 
provide additional information to the user regarding scarcity of tickets.  
 The most meaningful result is the interaction between markedness and anchoring 
on perceptions of scarcity (see figure 4), thereby providing partial support for hypothesis 
5b. In spite of numerical information, or explicit scarcity, remaining the same using the 
word big or small resulted in significantly different perceptions of scarcity in the high 
anchor condition. The effect may occur because respondents in the low anchor condition 
(2,000) are more certain about the (lack of) scarcity and thus are not receptive to 
additional cues, but in the high anchor condition (8,000) the scarcity is a bit unclear and 
thus respondents rely on the qualitative cues for help.  
An alternative, and a more theoretically driven explanation, is the marked term 
(small) is linguistically more powerful and thus decrease perceptions of scarcity but the 
unmarked term cannot increase the numerical estimate.  For example, in the high anchor 
(8000) condition, perceptions of scarcity may be lower in the marked condition because 
of the marked, and powerful nature of small. Following the same reasoning, in the low 
anchor condition (2000), the unmarked condition cannot increase perceptions of scarcity 
because of the default, and subsequently less powerful, nature of big. The linguistic 
power, and subsequent potential for asymmetric responses, is explored further in 
subsequent studies. 
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Study 6: Markedness  + Anchoring + Temporal Unit Framing 
 
How many hours are there in a day? The answer, as almost any consumer knows, 
is 24. How many hours are there in a year? While the answer can be mathematically 
calculated, it is not as salient in the minds of consumers (answer is 8,760). Traditional 
anchoring studies typically involve little or no salient numerical constraint given 
questions such as the record high temperature for a day in Seattle, Washington (Wegener 
et al. 2001; Blankenship et al. 2008), the year George Washington was elected president 
(Epley and Gilovich 2001, 2005, 2006), and length of the Mississippi River (Jacowitz and 
Kahneman 1995; Epley and Gilovich 2006).  In the traditional anchoring example, the 
respondent is tasked with estimating a given value from a theoretically unlimited number 
of possibilities. Consider an estimation task based on the length of a whale in meters, 
which has previously been used (Strack and Mussweiler 1997; Mussweiler and Strack 
2000). Mussweiler and Strack (2000) designed a study using plausible versus implausible 
anchors to show the diminishing returns of anchoring beyond a plausible limit. The 
authors define plausible as a “target with a value that lies within the distribution of 
possible values for the target” (p. 499). This definition emphasizes the mental plausibility 
of a number and not the mathematical possibility of a number. Assume a person estimates 
that a whale is 10 meters long. What does that suggest the whale is not? 11 meters. 100 
meters. 1,000 meters.  Contrast this problem with a judgment in a constrained setting (e. 
g., hours in a day). For example, consider the following two questions: 
 
(A) How many hours per day does the average person spend watching television? 
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(B) How many hours per year does the average person spend watching television? 
 
Assume the estimate of time the average TV is watched is for 5 hours per day.  What 
does that suggest about the time the TV is not watched (i.e., off)? There is only one 
answer. Simple math (24 – 5 = 19) suggests the person estimates the TV is not watched 
for 19 hours per day. Negated adjectives, such as not on, can influence perceptions in 
counter intuitive ways, such as a mitigated sense of the alternative, which in this example 
would be off (see Bianchi, Savardi, Burro, and Torquati, 2011; Fraenkel and Schul, 2008; 
Paradis and Willners, 2006; Schul, 2011). Although knowledge may effect susceptibility 
to the anchor (Wilson, Houston, Etling, and Brekke, 1996), there are other ways to ask 
questions with mathematical constraints (e. g., hours per day vs. hours per year) where 
knowledge may not be as strong due to difficulty in calculations or numerical processing.  
Hours per day can be mathematically converted to hours per year, but it raises an 
interesting point, as previously discussed, about logical versus informational equivalence 
(McKenzie and Nelson 2003).  In addition, exploring unit framing builds on other 
research on temporal construal/distance (Monga and Bagchi 2012) in studies on 
quantitative expressions by incorporating conflicting distances (hours and years). Study 5 
is designed to determine the effect of constraints on markedness while incorporating 
potential knowledge effects (Wilson, Houston, Etling, and Brekke, 1996) given 
differences in unit presentation. Thus: 
H6: The unmarked (marked) condition will result in significantly higher (lower) 
estimates. The effect will be magnified as the units become more granular. 
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Method 
 
Four hundred and sixty five adults (64% male; Mage = 30 years) participated via 
Amazon’s mTurk. The study utilized a 2 (Markedness: Marked vs. Unmarked) by 2 (First 
Unit: Minutes vs. Hours) by 2 (Second Unit: Per Day vs. Per Year) between-subjects 
design.  The goal was to illustrate the effects of markedness when a constraint is clear 
(i.e., hours per day) and when units are not (i.e., minutes per year). For example, 
depending on the condition the respondent was randomly assigned, they saw: 
 
How [few/many] [minutes/hours] per [day/year] does the average person spend 
watching television? 
 
The goal of the study is to look at the interaction of markedness when the salience 
of the unit constraint is different. Given there are only 24 hours in a day and 8,760 hours 
in a year, the mathematical constraints may limit the effect of markedness depending on 
how the units are communicated. Furthermore, the study tests few and many in a 
consumer situation to better show the effect across a variety of markedness pairs and 
marketing scenarios.  
 
Results 
 
Numerical Estimate. There was a marginally significant main effect of 
markedness, F(1,470) = 3.19, p = .075, a significant main effect of first unit 
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(minutes/hours), F(1,470) = 25.14, p < .001, and second unit (per day/per year), F(1,470) 
= 42.24, p < .001, on numerical estimates of the amount of time spent watching television. 
On a per day basis, respondents in the unmarked condition (M = 2.52, SD = 2.13) made 
higher estimates than those estimates in the marked condition (M = 2.19, SD = 2.16 ). In 
addition, there was a significant interaction between markedness and the second unit (per 
day/per year), F(1,470) = 8.71, p = .003, and a significant interaction between the first 
(minutes/hours) unit and the second unit (per day/per year), F(1,470) = 6.30 p = .012. 
Figure 5 shows the markedness and second unit interaction while figure 6 illustrates the 
estimated hours of television viewing by conditions.  
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Response Time. There was no main effect of markedness (F(1,470) = .011, p 
= .916) on response time. There was, however, a main effect of the second unit (per 
day/per year), F(1,470) = 21.81 p < .001, but not the first unit, F(1,470) = 1.31, p = .254. 
There were no significant interactions (all p's > .08).   
 
Discussion 
 
Study 6 shows how markedness works in another context, television viewing, and 
with other factors such as units. As figure 6 shows, the difference between the unmarked 
term and the marked term actually becomes smaller as the units get more granular, thereby 
rejecting hypothesis 6.  The assumption was that cognitive load was highest in the minutes 
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per year condition as, mathematically, it is tough to compute 60 minutes per hour times 24 
hours per day times 365 days per year to make a numerical judgment. The response time 
was longest in the minutes per year condition, which confirms that the minutes per year 
condition required the most processing. The numerical estimates, however, suggest the 
biggest effect occurred in the hours per day condition.  
As confirmed by the significant interaction between markedness and the second 
unit (per day/per year), markedness had a bigger effect in the per day condition than the 
per year condition.  Again, this is surprising as the per year condition requires more 
cognitive processing which would presumably make the respondent more susceptible to 
the markedness differences as it has in other numerical judgment research (Blankenship 
et al. 2008).  
 
Study 7: Markedness + Half Full/Empty 
 
“Is the glass half full or half empty?” 
 
The question is a staple of cultural wisdom purporting to reflect one’s outlook on 
life. If the glass is half full, one is considered an optimist; but if the glass is half empty, 
one is considered a pessimist (Henninger 1944). From a strictly numerical perspective, or 
logical equivalence (Johnson-Laird and Shafir 1993; Shafir 1993), there is little argument 
that either way the glass has 50% of its maximum capacity. Recent academic literature, 
however, suggests that there may be more to this piece of cultural wisdom. 
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The prior research in this dissertation has focused on the effects of markedness on 
pairs such as big and small. Study 2 suggested that big results in larger numerical 
estimates than small. Study 7 now explores the same concept but utilizes full and empty 
in order to explore their linguistic differences. Consider the following examples: 
 
(A) The arena is 75% full. 
(B) The arena is 75% big. 
 
  Statement (A) is considered a linguistically acceptable statement as full is allowed 
to be numerically quantified (Holleman and Pander Maat 2009) unlike big (B). Similarly, 
stating “the arena is very full” seems to decrease the amount of fullness while stating “the 
arena is very big” increases the amount of big (Tribushinina 2011). Thus, it raises an 
interesting research question to determine the effects of markedness on different types of 
adjectives. Now consider these examples in a questioning context: 
 
(C) How full is the arena? 
(D) How empty is the arena? 
 
In the above pair, (C) would be considered the unmarked condition while (D) 
would likely be considered the marked condition based on the frequency (Waugh 1982; 
Hume 2004, 2011), the preference for the unmarked term in question form (Lehrer 1985), 
and the goal of the arena being full (Holleman and Pander Maat 2009). Consider this new 
set of paired statements: 
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(E) The arena is full.  
(F) The arena is empty. 
 
 In the above example, the numerical interpretation is straightforward. (E) suggests 
that the arena is at, or very near, 100% capacity while (F) suggests the arena is at, or very 
near 0% capacity based on linguistic interpretation of full and empty by Kennedy and 
McNally (2005). What happens, however, if you slightly alter the information with a 
numerical cue or qualifier? For example: 
 
(G) The arena is half full. 
(H) The arena is half empty. 
 
The use of half brings full and empty to an equivalent level in terms of numerical 
information. An arena that is half full is 50% full and 50% empty, but an arena that is half 
empty is also 50% full and 50% empty. McKenzie and Nelson (2003) explored a similar 
framing relative to choice but focused on an actual glass: 
 
Imagine a 4-ounce measure cup in front of you that is completely filled with water 
up to the 4-ounce line. You then leave the room briefly and come back to find that 
the water is now at the 2-ounce line. What is the most natural way to describe the 
cup now? 
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In this particular listener scenario, respondents were more likely to describe the 
cup as half empty given it had previously been full, and half full when the cup was 
previously empty. In the same article, the author’s varied the scenario so half full and half 
empty were used in the speaker’s frame. In both studies, however, the half full versus half 
empty distinction came down to a choice or decision, as opposed to a judgment or 
numerical estimate of attendance.  
Study 7 uses this premise to further explore the implications of markedness when 
additional information (e.g., half) bring the bidirectional cues to numerical equivalence, 
in addition to having the respondent indicate a numerical value based on the half full or 
half empty frame. 
H7A: The unmarked (marked) term will result in significantly higher (lower) 
numerical estimates. 
 
Furthermore, there is potential for another interesting interpretation of the half 
empty versus half full framing. Essentially no research has empirically looked at the force, 
or rate of change, of markedness as briefly discussed in future research suggestions by 
Holleman and Pander Maat (2009). Similarly, Moxey (2010, p. 130) conceptually 
suggests “half full should be more ambiguous in terms of information ‘leaked’ about the 
reference point while half empty should lead to a relatively strong bias towards full as the 
reference point”. As an example, consider the following statements: 
 
(I) The arena will be half full at halftime. 
(J) The arena will be half empty at halftime. 
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The statements are numerically equivalent in terms of suggesting a 50% capacity 
but, consistent with Sher and McKenzie (2006), they do not appear to be informationally 
equivalent. Statement (I) seems to imply that the attendance will be increasing at the time 
halftime occurs, but (J) seems to imply that the attendance will be decreasing. Previous 
research has shown that a 2 oz. cup of water is described as half empty if it was 
previously full of 4 oz. of water but is described as half full if it previously was empty 
(McKenzie and Nelson 2003). The primary piece that previous research ignores, however, 
is the rate at which the increase or decrease is perceived. Similarly, previous research 
ignores the bidirectional asymmetry (i.e., big and small are not interpreted as complete 
opposites) associated with markedness that has previously been documented in this 
dissertation. In other words, half empty (J) may suggest that attendance in the arena is 
declining at a faster rate than when the half full frame (I) is used.  
H7B: The unmarked (marked) term will result in significantly slower (faster) 
decline of attendance over time. 
 
Method 
 
One hundred and seven adults (72% male; Mage = 31 years) participated via 
Amazon mTurk. The study uses a simple markedness (Marked vs. Unmarked) between-
subjects design. Respondents were presented with the following scenario: 
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Imagine you are thinking about going to a professional basketball game with a 
friend. A few days before the game, your friend says:   
 
“The arena will probably be half [full/empty] at halftime." 
 
Please indicate the number of people you think will be in the arena at each point 
of the game. 
 
Respondents were then asked to indicate the number of people in the arena at four 
points in the game: first quarter, second quarter, third quarter, and fourth quarter. In 
addition, respondents were then asked a variety of questions including likelihood of 
attending, willingness to pay for a ticket, and a variety of scarcity scales adapted from 
previous research (Aggarwal et al. 2011; Aguirre-Rodriguez 2013) that were used 
previously in this dissertation.  Dunegan (1993) suggested the use of half empty might 
result in more controlled and systematic decision processes. As such, response time was 
recorded to rule out processing differences between the two conditions. 
 
Results 
 
Numerical Estimate and Rate of Change. There was no significant main effect of 
markedness on numerical estimates, F(1,105) = 1.84, p = .179. However, there was a 
significant effect of quarter, F(1,105) = 14.85, p < .001 In addition, there was a 
significant interaction between markedness and quarter , F(1,105) = 20.61, p < .001, 
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which confirms differences in the rate of change. Table 8 shows the means and standard 
deviations of estimates by markedness and quarter. In addition, figure 7 visually presents 
the results.  
Other Dependent Variables. There was a significant effect on perceptions of 
competitiveness and closeness of the score of the game. Respondents in the unmarked 
(half full) condition indicated the game would be significantly closer and more 
competitive (M = 4.45, SD = 1.33) than respondents in the unmarked condition (M = 3.50, 
SD = 1.58), F(1,106) = 11.49, p = .001. There was, however, no significant difference 
between the final score estimates of the home team and away team, F(1,106) = 1.13, p 
= .289. Respondents in the half full condition perceived tickets as more scarce (M = 4.07, 
SD = 1.36), in contrast to respondents in the half empty condition (M = 3.12, SD = 1.56), 
F(1,106) = 11.51, p = .001. Finally, there was no significant difference in response time, 
F(1,106) = 1.24, p = .725. 
 
 
Table 8. Estimates of crowd size by quarter and condition (study 7) 
  Half Full   Half Empty 
  Mean SD N   Mean SD N 
First Quarter 6,676 7,852 55   10,999 10,084 52 
Second Quarter 7,076 8,199 55  10,313 8,988 52 
Third Quarter 7,534 8,642 55  8,600 7,971 52 
Fourth Quarter 6,914 8,355 55   6,783 6,851 52 
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Discussion 
 
 Study 7 is interesting for a variety of reasons. First, it illustrates how markedness 
effects numerical estimates at a point in time that was not referenced in the prompt. In 
other words, providing information about attendance at halftime (e.g., half full vs. half 
empty) resulted in significantly different numerical estimates in the first quarter. In 
addition, both scenarios provide numerically equivalent information (50% capacity) yet 
resulted in different numerical estimates, thereby partially supporting hypothesis 7a. 
 Second, the study illustrates that markedness not only effects numerical estimates, 
as shown in previous studies in this dissertation but also the slope of estimates over time. 
The half full condition resulted in similar numerical estimates throughout the game while 
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the half empty condition resulted in significant decline in attendance estimates 
throughout the game. These results show that markedness not only effects numerical 
perceptions at one time but also effects rate of change over time, thereby supporting 
hypothesis 7b.  
 Third, the results further support the notion of information leakage (Sher and 
McKenzie 2006) in a variety of ways. As discussed, framing the arena as half full versus 
half empty resulted in significantly different numerical estimates in the first quarter, 
which shows that information is leaked.  Stating, “The arena will be half empty at 
halftime,” seems to suggest the arena will be declining in attendance, while stating “The 
arena will be half full at halftime” suggests attendance will be increasing, or at the very 
least, attendance will remain stable. Furthermore, inferences were drawn about the 
competitive nature of the game based on a description of attendance at halftime. 
Respondents in the half full condition assumed the game would be much more 
competitive than the half empty scenario. This further highlights a theory beyond 
information leakage as respondents drew different conclusions about the competitiveness 
of the game based on a frame.  
 
Study 8: Markedness + Half Empty/Full + 20,000 Capacity 
 
Study 8 is similar to study 7 in that both emphasize markedness in numerical 
perceptions but answer several pertinent questions: What is the capacity of the arena? 
How does this additional numerical information influence attendance estimates? Study 8 
did not include any information about the capacity of the arena. Thus, including the 
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capacity of the arena may put the emphasis back on the numerical interpretation (i.e., 
50% of 20,000) as opposed to the linguistic cues inherent in the half empty vs. half full 
framing. For example: 
 
(A) The arena holds 20,000 people. It will probably be half full at halftime. 
(B) The arena holds 20,000 people. It will probably be half empty at halftime. 
 
Similar to study 7, (A) and (B) once again are different in their markedness but 
incorporate a capacity which provides additional numerical information. Given that the 
numerical information references the capacity of the arena and not the expected 
attendance at halftime, although it can clearly be calculated, it leaves open the potential 
for markedness effects in the presence of numbers. 
 
Method 
 
One hundred and eleven adults (61% male; Mage = 29 years) were recruited via 
Amazon’s mTurk. The study uses a very similar procedure to study 7 with a slight 
variation to include the capacity of the arena. For example, respondents were presented 
with the following scenario: 
 
Imagine you are thinking about going to a professional basketball game with a 
friend. A few days before the game, your friend says:   
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“The arena holds 20,000 people. It will probably be half [full/empty] at halftime." 
 
Please indicate the number of people you think will be in the arena at each point 
of the game. 
 
Similar to study 7, respondents were then asked to indicate the number of people 
in the arena at four points in the game: first quarter, second quarter, third quarter, and 
fourth quarter. In addition, respondents were then asked a variety of questions including 
likelihood of attending, willingness to pay for a ticket, a variety of scarcity scales adapted 
from previous research (Aggarwal et al. 2011; Aguirre-Rodriguez 2013), and their 
perception of the competitiveness of the game. Dunegan (1993) suggested the use of half 
empty might result in more controlled and systematic decision processes.  As such, 
response time was recorded once again to explore processing differences between the two 
conditions. 
 
Results 
 
Numerical Estimate and Rate of Change. There was a significant main effect of 
markedness on numerical estimates, F(1,109) = 4.91, p < .029, and quarter on numerical 
estimates, F(1,121) = 7.51, p = .007 . Respondents in the unmarked condition estimated a 
significantly higher attendance (M = 11,864) than respondents in the marked (i.e., half 
empty) condition (M = 9,377). There was also a significant markedness and quarter 
interaction, F(1,109) = 11.28, p = .001, which confirms differences in the rate of change. 
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Table 9 shows the means and standard deviations of estimates by markedness and quarter, 
and figure 8 visually presents the results.  
Other Dependent Variables.  There was a significant main effect of markedness 
on perceptions of the competitiveness of the game, F(1,110) = 10.57, p = .001), and 
estimates of the difference of the final outcome, F(1,110) = 7.39, p = .008. Respondents 
in the unmarked condition estimated the home team would win the game by 6.43 points, 
but respondents in the marked condition estimated the home team would lose by 1.79 
points.   Furthermore, respondents in the unmarked condition perceived tickets as more 
scarce (M = 4.09, SD = 1.43) than respondents in the marked condition (M = 3.22, SD = 
1.52), F(1,110) = 9.61, p =.002. Finally, there was no significant difference in response 
time between the two conditions, F(1,110) = 2.52, p = .115. 
 
 
Table 9. Estimates of crowd size by quarter and condition (study 8) 
    Half Full       Half Empty   
  Mean SD N   Mean SD N 
First Quarter 11,039 5,972 55   11,025 7,217 56 
Second Quarter 12,469 6,445 55  10,005 6,571 56 
Third Quarter 12,559 6,539 55  8,778 5,892 56 
Fourth Quarter 11,388 6,212 55   7,701 6,276 56 
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Discussion 
 
Study 8 largely confirms the effects witnessed in study 7, thereby supporting 
hypotheses 7a and 7b. Rather than the additional numerical information removing the 
effect of the half empty versus half full framing, it confirms it. This study is uniquely 
different than study 7, for one primary reason: capacity. Although half empty still shows a 
significantly different rate of change than half full, the largest difference in numerical 
estimates occurs in the fourth quarter in this study rather than the first quarter in study 7. 
In other words, including the capacity of 20,000 moved the primary numerical estimate 
effect from the first quarter to the fourth quarter.  
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One potential theory is the capacity (20,000) provides a goal for the half full 
condition to reach but that goal does not apply to the half empty condition as it is 
assumed that attendance will decline over time. Another argument is the capacity 
(20,000) combined with half (50%) provides a starting point for a numerical estimate and 
thus respondents utilize the information for estimates in the first quarter. In study 7, with 
no capacity, the two conditions are perhaps more reliant on the linguistics cues as there is 
no clear numerical starting point based on the information provided. 
 
Study 9: Markedness + Half Full/Empty + No Halftime 
 
 Study 9 once again attempts to test approaches to remove the effect of 
markedness. Study 8 looked at adding information (a number) to further emphasize the 
numerical component of the scenario. Study 9 aims to subtract information to test 
methods to remove the overall effect. To illustrate this, consider the following example: 
 
(A) The arena will probably be half empty at halftime. 
(B) The arena will probably be half empty. 
 
In this context, (A) references half empty but seems to imply, as previous studies 
confirm, that a change is occurring. The other statement (B) seems to imply that no 
change is taking place and the arena will remain half empty throughout the game. As 
such, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
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H9: The unmarked (marked) term will result in significantly higher (lower) 
estimates of attendance. 
 
Method 
One hundred and nine adults (71% male; Mage = 31 years) participated via 
Amazon mTurk. Study 9 uses very similar condition wording to study 7 with one 
exception -  “at halftime” is removed from the scenario: 
 
Imagine you are thinking about going to a professional basketball game with a 
friend. A few days before the game, your friend says:   
 
“The arena will probably be half [full/empty]." 
 
Please indicate the number of people you think will be in the arena at each point 
of the game. 
 
Results 
 
Numerical Estimate and Rate of Change. There was no significant effect of 
markedness on numerical estimates, F(1,107) = .355, p = .553. There was a significant 
effect of quarter, F(1,107) = 9.79, p =.002. Finally, there was no significant markedness 
and quarter interaction, F(1,107) = .007 , p = .935, suggesting markedness did not effect 
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the rate of attendance over time. Table 10 shows the means and standard deviations, and 
figure 9 illustrates the numerical estimates of attendance in each quarter by markedness.  
Other Dependent Variables.  There was no significant main effect of markedness 
on perceptions of the competitiveness of the game, F(1,108) = 1.50, p =.223. There was a 
marginal effect of markedness on estimates of the difference of the final score, F(1,107) 
= 2.81, p = .097. Interestingly, respondents in the unmarked (i.e., half full) condition 
estimated the home team would win the game by 2.04 points while respondents in the 
marked condition estimated the home team would win the game by 5.67 points. In 
addition, in spite of no significant difference in attendance estimates, respondents in the 
unmarked condition perceived tickets as more scarce (M = 3.59, SD = 1.62) than 
respondents in the marked condition (M = 2.76, SD = 1.43), F(1,108) = 7.91, p = .006. 
Finally, there was no significant difference in response time between the two conditions, 
F(1, 107) = 1.18, p = .280. 
 
Table 10. Estimates of crowd size by quarter and condition (study 9) 
    Half Full       Half Empty   
  Mean SD N   Mean SD N 
First Quarter 6,276 5,836 52   6,996 5,964 57 
Second Quarter 7,050 6,130 52  7,699 6,747 57 
Third Quarter 6,786 5,827 52  7,384 6,789 57 
Fourth Quarter 5,245 4,761 52   5,921 5,720 57 
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Discussion 
  
Study 9 removes the effect experience in studies 7 and 8. The only difference 
between the previous studies is the removal of “at halftime” from the scenario. The 
combination of the three studies highlights the importance of having a point at which the 
arena is half empty or half full. As discussed, stating, “The arena will probably be half 
full [half empty]," seems to imply the arena is always that way as opposed to, “The arena 
will probably be half full [half empty] at halftime,” which suggests significant change 
occurs at halftime.  Although markedness did not effect overall numerical estimates in the 
study, additional information was still communicated, or leaked (Sher and McKenzie 
2006). Differences in perceptions of scarcity and estimates of the final score were 
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observed, which further illustrates that, in spite of the frame providing information on 
attendance, information is leaked that significantly influences perceptions of related 
inference such as scarcity and score of the game, thereby supporting hypothesis 9. 
 
Study 10: Markedness + Half Empty/Full + 10,000 Capacity 
 
Study 10 is similar to study 8 in emphasizing markedness in numerical 
perceptions but answers a pertinent question: How does changing the reference point 
effect how unmarked and marked terms operate? Study 7 suggests that the reference 
point for an arena is roughly 16,000 based on the average halftime attendance prediction 
being 8,300. Study 8 showed how the reference point could be moved upward based on a 
provided capacity of 20,000. Study 10 aims to manipulate the reference point by stating a 
lower arena capacity. Given respondents in the half full condition estimated attendance as 
high as 12,559, from an absolute numerical perspective, they presumably believe that an 
arena that seats 10,000 could sell out. As such, the half full condition may experience a 
more positive slope, but the half empty frame may not work as well given a professional 
basketball game with less than 5,000 seems unreasonable.  
 
Method 
 
One hundred and five adults (69% male; Mage = 29 years) were recruited via 
Amazon’s mTurk.  Study 10 uses an identical setup to study 8 with one change: the 
capacity of the arena is reduced to 10,000.  
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Imagine you are thinking about going to a professional basketball game with a 
friend. A few days before the game, your friend says:   
 
“The arena holds 10,000 people. It will probably be half [full/empty] at halftime." 
 
Please indicate the number of people you think will be in the arena at each point 
of the game. 
 
The same dependent variables used in the previous three studies are used in study 
10 including numerical estimates in each quarter, competitiveness of the game, and 
scarcity of tickets. 
 
Results 
 
Numerical Estimate and Rate of Change. There was no significant main effect of 
markedness on numerical estimates, F(1,103) = 2.30, p = .132. However, there was a 
significant effect of quarter F(1,103) = 8.66, p = .004. Finally, there was a significant 
markedness and quarter interaction, F(1,103) = 2.30, p < .001, suggesting markedness 
influenced the rate of attendance over time. Table 11 shows the means and standard 
deviations, and figure 10 illustrates the numerical estimates of attendance in each quarter 
by markedness. 
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Other Dependent Variables.  There was a significant main effect of markedness 
on perceptions of the competitiveness of the game, F(1,104) = 5.48, p = .021. There was 
no significant effect of markedness on estimates of the difference of the final score, 
F(1,104) = .028, p = .868, nor a significant difference in the perceived scarcity of tickets, 
F(1,103) = 2.50, p = .117. Finally, there was no significant difference in response time 
between the two conditions, F(1,104) = .327, p = .569. 
 
Table 11. Estimates of crowd size by quarter and condition (study 10) 
    Half Full       Half Empty   
  Mean SD N   Mean SD N 
First Quarter 5,008 2,713 54   6,351 3,657 51 
Second Quarter 6,008 2,773 54  6,071 3,365 51 
Third Quarter 6,384 2,879 54  4,545 2,565 51 
Fourth Quarter 6,111 3,052 54   3,486 2,245 51 
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Discussion 
  
The three studies utilizing halftime (i.e., studies 7, 8, and 10) generate substantial new 
information and theories on markedness and adjectives. The studies on half empty and 
half full confirm a couple theories: 
 
1. The half full condition must never end below 50%.  
2. The half empty condition must never end above 50%. 
 
The question is, “Why?” Half full does not end below the reference point because 
that would violate the term. Half implies 50%, but full implies 100%. Thus, the numerical 
estimate for half full must fall between 50% and 100%, which is confirmed in study 8 and 
study 10. Similarly, empty implies 0% and thus half empty must fall between 50% and 
0%. Where this result does not hold true is the first half of the game, before the time at 
which the reference information is pertinent. Combined with the goal of an arena being 
full, the half empty condition remains above the reference point in the first half.  
In the three studies referencing halftime, and regardless of the capacity provided, 
the half empty term resulted in an attendance decline in every quarter. If half empty and 
half full were both numerically and informationally equivalent, the patterns of attendance 
over the four quarters would look nearly identical or, at the very least, exhibit similar 
behavior up until the point new information is provided (halftime) and then change 
course as illustrated in figure 11.  
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The results of the three studies, however, confirm otherwise. Full is unmarked 
given it is the more positive term and consistent with the goal of filling an arena 
(Holleman and Pander Maat 2009), but empty is the marked term. This result leads to 
another theory that is confirmed by the three studies. 
 
3. Marked terms, such as half empty, are inherently more meaningful and thus 
continually reflect a rate of change consistent with that term.  
 
The argument is that an unmarked term does not carry enough information 
because it is used frequently and represents the goal; hence, it is loses its meaning. 
Similar to “How tall are you?” losing any suggestion of the magnitude of a person’s 
First Quarter Second Quarter Third Quarter Fourth Quarter 
Figure 11. Illustration of intuition based on provided information in 
prompt  
Half Full 
Half Empty 
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height, half full operates in a similar fashion. Conversely, half empty is similar to asking 
“How short are you?”, and thus carries additional magnitude related information that is 
showcased in the previous studies. The experiments in Chapter III illustrate the power of 
a markedness approach and present an opportunity for new theory on numeric judgment 
that is discussed in Chapter IV.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THEORETICAL AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS  
 
Study Summaries 
 
 This dissertation incorporated ten studies with a progressive goal of further 
understanding the role of markedness on numerical perceptions. The first study aimed to 
confirm theoretical arguments that frequency of language use is a component of 
markedness (Greenberg 2005). A modern method, Google Trends, was used to explore 
this question given it’s use in predicting disease outbreak (Polgreen et al. 2008; Carneiro 
and Mylonakis 2009) and economic indicators (Choi and Varian 2012) among other 
consumer related scenarios. The results showed that unmarked terms were searched more 
frequently than marked terms. This finding was a critical first step as the remainder of the 
dissertation builds off the assumption that markedness is a prevalent component of 
interpersonal communication and, subsequently, marketing communication. 
 Once one of the primary tenets of markedness, frequency, had been illustrated in 
study 1, the next couple studies focused on how word usage effects numerical perceptions. 
Study 2 incorporated a design to test an unmarked term, marked term, and also a more 
neutral term to illustrate how word choice effects numerical perceptions. As hypothesized, 
the unmarked term resulted in larger numerical estimates than the marked term. 
Furthermore, there were no significant differences between the unmarked term and the 
neutral term. As discussed, this result is similar to asking a person “How tall are you?” 
versus “What is your height?” Study 2 confirmed the unique relationship between 
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unmarked, marked, and a neutral framing associated with markedness and opened the 
door for further exploration of additional effects or variables that may play a role in 
understanding linguistic cues. 
 Given the intertwining of words and numbers discussed in the literature review, 
study 3 was developed to explore how markedness interacts with other numerical based 
theories such as anchoring. One limitation of study 2 was that no numbers were present, 
and thus the respondent was solely relying on word cues. Study 3 illustrates that even 
when numbers (or anchors) are present, markedness effects still occur. At a broader level, 
the results from study 3 continued to support the premise of this dissertation, which is 
that markedness effects perceptions in a unique fashion. 
The previous studies (studies 1-3) established that frequency was a component of 
markedness and markedness effected numerical estimates. Study 4 aimed to explore 
whether markedness and adjectives effect the range of potential estimates. Admittedly, 
there are other ways to test this theory but one additional goal was to move away from 
the question form of the previous two studies.  Study 4 confirmed that people perceive a 
smaller range of numbers in the marked condition than in the unmarked condition. The 
results have implications not only for markedness research but other prominent consumer 
research theories such as latitude of acceptance (Hovland et al. 1957; Simonson et al. 
2013). This finding goes beyond traditional framing literature to provide a theory, 
markedness, to argue why one word over another results in a significantly smaller 
consideration of numerical possibilities.  
The goal of study 5 was to further explore markedness in a more real world 
scenario while also exploring effects beyond numerical estimates. Furthermore, study 5 
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used capacity as a constraint due to similarities between how unmarked (Tribushinina 
2009) and high anchors (Jacowitz and Kahneman 1995) are interpreted. As discussed, 
both unmarked terms (e.g., big) and high anchors (e.g., 8,000) guide a user to consider an 
unlimited range of upward possibilities. Adding a capacity constraint, however, reduces 
the ability to consider an unlimited range of numbers. Although the results of study 5 
were disappointing relative to expectations, it sparked a meaningful direction for future 
studies including a temporal component and further exploration of capacity constraints.  
For example, it inspired the question, “How does markedness effect numerical 
perceptions over perceived time (i.e. unit framing) and actual time (e.g., first quarter to 
fourth quarter)?” Furthermore, study 5 suggested an effect of capacity on numerical 
perceptions. Both time and capacity, in addition to markedness, became key components 
of the effects witnessed in the remainder of the studies (studies 6-10).  
 Study 6 began further exploration of capacity constraints. As discussed, study 6 
incorporated an actual capacity constraint (hours per day), but the perception of the 
capacity is changed based on the units that are used (e.g., hours per day versus minutes 
per year). In other words, there is a numerical constraint to the number of hours someone 
could watch television in a given time period (e.g., 24 hours per day). Changing the units 
in which the question is framed, however, changes the understanding of the capacity 
constraint. Interestingly, markedness effects were stronger when respondents were asked 
to indicate the number of hours per day the average person watches television compared 
to the number of minutes per year. As shown in the results for study 6, both scenarios are 
mathematically constrained (e.g., 24 hours in a day and 525,600 minutes in a year), yet 
markedness effects are different depending on the temporal framing.  
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Study 7 marks a slight transition to a scenario, half empty versus half full, in 
which the numerical interpretation, 50%, is identical. In doing so, it further controls the 
numerical information present in the frame and highlights the potential for linguistic cues 
to effect perceptions. Study 7 showed the counterintuitive effects of using an unmarked 
(half full) versus a marked (half empty) frame. Furthermore, not only did the frame, 
which communicates numerically equivalent information on attendance, effect 
perceptions of attendance, but the frame also influenced the perceived scarcity of tickets 
and competitiveness of the game. One question unaddressed in study 7 was the capacity 
of the arena, which was the inspiration behind study 8. 
The impetus behind study 8 was the potential for a number (20,000) to negate the 
effect of word cues. The results from study 8, however, still show a strong difference 
between half full (unmarked) and half empty (marked) on estimates of crowd size 
throughout the game. Furthermore, the framing drastically effected perceptions of the 
final score of the game as respondents in the unmarked condition estimated the home 
team would win by 6.43 points while respondents in the marked condition estimated the 
home team would lose by 1.79 points. Study 8 highlights a spillover effect associated 
with markedness as information on attendance spilled over to effect perceptions of the 
game.  
 The goal behind study 9 was to remove the effect seen in studies 7 and 8. Study 9 
removed the “at half time” component of the scenario and highlighted the temporal 
aspect of the effects in studies 7 and 8. Stating “at halftime” communicates that a change 
will likely occur at that point. In other words, this conversational cue breaks the 
perceived pattern of what a user would expect the attendance to look like over time as it 
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indicates a specific point in time when a change is expected. Thus, the strong half empty 
versus half full effect seen in studies 7 and 8 was not present in study 9. 
Study 10 further explores the power of half full versus half empty by introducing a 
lower capacity constraint of 10,000. The idea was to reduce the capacity constraint 
enough to where half empty might not be as effective. In other words, 5,000 fans, 
representing 50% of the 10,000 capacity, is not very many for a professional basketball 
game and thus the half empty framing might not have as strong of a negative effect as 
observed in the previous studies. Although the reduced capacity shifted the interaction 
from the first quarter to the second quarter, the general conclusions and power of half 
empty versus half full framing remained the same. Regardless of whether there was no 
capacity (study 7), a capacity of 20,000 (study 8), or a capacity of 10,000 (study 10) there 
were still strong differences in the perceived attendance over the course of the game. In 
spite of the scenario only referencing attendance, respondents inferred additional 
information about the competitiveness of the game.  
The studies in this dissertation were structured in a manner that illustrated how 
markedness plays out in the real world (study 1), tested how markedness effects 
numerical perceptions in a single point in time (studies 2-5), and finally added a temporal 
component (studies 6-10). Although not every study led to the expected results, the 
progression of studies was critical to better understanding linguistic cues and exploring 
new angles (e.g. temporal, competitiveness of the game, etc.) to further advance a 
markedness approach to consumer behavior. 
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Major Conceptual Contribution 
 
The primary goal of this dissertation was to illustrate the effect of language on how 
people perceive and estimate numbers. This dissertation shows how markedness and 
language cues influence: 
 
1. Numerical estimates at a single point in time (studies 2 through 4). 
2. Numerical estimates over time (studies 6, 7, 8, and 10). 
3. Additional inferences associated with the task (studies 6 through 10). 
For example, language influenced attendance estimates at one point in time (a 
game), estimates over a period of time (four quarters throughout a game), and other 
judgments associated with the situation (score and competitiveness of the game). From a 
theoretical perspective, there are several takeaways from the studies presented in this 
research: 
 
1. The marked frame cues a strong response 
2. The marked response is opposing and asymmetric  
3. The marked frame spreads meaningful information regarding other judgments 
4. The marked response transcends the point in time of the cue 
The curveball effect is proposed as a simple, marketing friendly, term that 
represents a response that is opposing, asymmetric, carried out over perceived time, and 
influences other inferences associated with the scenario. Much like a fastball is the 
default, or unmarked, pitch in a baseball game, a curveball, or marked, pitch alters the 
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predicted sequence of events. Furthermore, a curveball often spills over to other aspects 
of the game (runners stealing, etc.) and thus is consistent with the effects seen in study 6 
through study 10.  
Consumers have an expectation of a particular sequence. In a sporting event 
context, consumers expect fans will enter the arena, stay for a while, and then exit. Thus, 
in the half full condition responses follow a typical sequence of event attendance. Crowd 
size rises early on, stabilizes toward the middle of the game, and falls toward the end. 
Half empty, on the other hand, does not follow this typical sequence but behaves as if a 
curveball was thrown. The curveball effect, is more than “information leakage” (Sher and 
McKenzie 2006) and builds on markedness (Holleman and Pander Maat 2009) because 
the language cue influences responses over a period of time, in an asymmetric fashion, 
and spills over to alter other perceptions associated with the situation such as the 
competitiveness of the game. 
 
Implications For Introduced Theories 
 
 A variety of theories have been discussed in this dissertation. This section 
addresses the viability of each in the context of the results of this program of research. 
 
Markedness 
 
Markedness was the central focus of this dissertation and, based on the studies in 
Chapter III, represents a very powerful theoretical approach to consumer judgment. 
Although discussed in further detail below, virtually every study in this dissertation 
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illustrated a markedness effect. The most profound are the latter studies that incorporate 
numerical equivalence (50%) but subtle linguistics differences in the half empty versus 
half full framing. Effects of markedness resulted in strikingly different estimates of 
attendance, perceived scarcity of tickets, and perceived competitiveness of the game. 
Although markedness was the primary theory of this dissertation, and discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter, the results from Chapter III have implications for several other 
theories as well. 
 
Anchoring 
 
Anchoring remains a very prominent theory and there is little in this dissertation 
that disputes its powerful effect. Study 3 showed the power of an anchor on numerical 
estimates which is consistent with past anchoring research such as Jacowitz and 
Kahneman (1995). Where this dissertation potentially raises questions regarding 
anchoring is in studies 7, 8 and 10. These studies effectively anchor the respondent at 
50% attendance at halftime yet the numerical estimates vary greatly depending on the 
linguistic cues. For example, study 8 used a capacity of 20,000 which, given the half 
empty and half full scenario, indirectly anchored the respondent at 10,000 fans at halftime. 
The linguistic cues, however, drastically effected estimated of crowd size throughout the 
game and, in many cases, away from the numerical information provided in the scenario.  
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Processing Theories 
 
Although not a key component of this dissertation, fuzzy trace theory represents 
an interesting explanation for how consumers process numbers and words. The studies 
show a varying preference for words and numbers. Study 3, for example, shows a strong 
effect of the number while study 8 shows a strong effect of the marked word. 
Furthermore, there was no indication that fluency, often associated with processing and 
response time (Schooler and Hertwig 2005; Oppenheimer 2008), played a role in the 
results. Response latency literature also suggests positive judgments are made more 
quickly than negative judgments (e.g. Herr and Page, 2004). If this outcome were the 
case, there would be a consistent pattern of response time differences in the studies 
assuming the unmarked term is generally considered positive while the marked term, in 
an adjective sense, is considered negative. For example, in study 2, there was no 
significant difference in response time between “How big is the average crowd…” and 
“How small is the average crowd…” in spite of numerical differences in attendance 
estimates. Similarly, System 1 versus System 2 processing is often measured via response 
time, and again, this dissertation did not illustrate any significant processing differences 
between conditions. Processing theories, and subsequently response time, remain an area 
worth studying to further determine the processing mechanisms behind the differences in 
numerical estimates displayed in this dissertation.  
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Latitude of Acceptance 
 
 Although markedness was the primary focus of this dissertation, latitude of 
acceptance may play a role, as study 4 suggests, in numerical perceptions. In study 4, 
respondents in the marked condition estimated a narrower range of crowd size than 
respondents in the unmarked condition. This falls in line with latitude of acceptance 
(Hovland et al. 1957; Simonson et al. 2013) which is described as “the range and 
concentration of task-acceptable comparisons” (Simonson et al., 2013, p. 140). Thus, 
study 4 illustrates a latitude of acceptance effect, and suggests linguistic cues may play an 
even larger role in the range of considerations in a judgment task. 
 
Broader Theoretical Contributions 
 
Markedness is a theory that is buried deep in our culture, our language, our life, 
and our marketing. It is more than just a fun effect that shows up when you ask people to 
estimate the crowd size at a football game. It is more than an unexpected result when you 
frame a scenario as half empty or half full. At a broad level, a markedness approach to 
marketing has major theoretical implications. In some ways markedness represents the 
default option of marketing. The power of the default option in choice has been well 
documented (Johnson and Goldstein 2003), and markedness represents a potentially 
similar corollary. Similar to Gricean norms (Grice 1975), people communicate in 
predictable ways. We talk in how big things are, not in how small things are. We ask how 
many of something there are, not how few. A markedness approach to marketing 
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encourages academic researchers and marketing practitioners to pay closer attention to 
linguistic assumptions and cues in marketing efforts. 
As Battistella (1990) points out, markedness appears in physical form too. We 
shake hands with our right hand, we salute with our right hand, and more often than not, 
we write with our right hand. In a sports context, take a pitcher for example. The 
assumption is that the pitcher is right-handed. What do we call a left-handed pitcher? A 
southpaw (Battistella 1996). How does this translate to marketing? Consider a baseball 
glove. Without any additional information, it is assumed the glove is for a person that 
throws right-handed. A glove for someone who throws left-handed is a special kind of 
glove. From a marketing perspective, gloves are not for a right-handed person and a left-
handed person. A glove is for a right-handed person. A left-handed glove is for a left-
handed person, because left-handed is unusual. We speak in default options, we market in 
default options, and this dissertation shows what can happen when we do not operate on 
the default assumption. 
Given recent calls for a more systematic approach to “explore the interplay of 
numerical and conversational processes in context” (Zhang and Schwarz, 2012, p. 258) 
and to “form classes of units or quantities” (Monga and Bagchi, 2012, p. 196), this 
research uses a markedness approach to explore numerical judgments. Although not 
specifically emphasizing units, a markedness approach has potential implications for unit 
differences as well, given conversational preferences for selection of one unit (e.g., 
hours) over another unit (e.g., milliseconds). Markedness theory has vast implications 
beyond numerical processing and thus highlights the importance of a better 
understanding of linguistics cues within the marketing literature. 
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Other Contributions to Theory 
 
This research makes several other theoretical contributions. First, in their 
typology of framing effects, Levin and colleagues (1998) argue that qualitative 
differences in linguistics may influence the results of frames. Although they propose a 
typology of framing effects (i.e., risky choice, attribute, and goal) and suggest linguistic 
variations may play a role, they only briefly discuss linguistic structure or categories 
(i.e., markedness) that may effect responses to frames. Furthermore, as these studies 
show, and in support of an information leakage (Sher and McKenzie 2006) approach, 
there is much more to framing from a linguistic and informational equivalence 
perspective than previously recognized by marketing literature. 
A linguistics approach furthers marketing research by offering a classification 
system for various types of words and expressions that are often utilized in marketing 
efforts. Results from popular social psychology principles, such as the default option 
(Johnson and Goldstein 2003), have been interpreted differently when viewed from a 
linguistics based lens (McKenzie et al. 2006), given assumptions about the speaker’s 
intent. There are likely many more results within the framing literature that could be re-
evaluated based on a linguistics and markedness approach, given that the questions or 
scenarios may not be informationally equivalent (McKenzie and Nelson 2003) as shown 
in this dissertation. 
Recent articles acknowledge a response asymmetry in like and dislike judgments 
(Herr and Page 2004; Herr et al. 2012) but do not explore the linguistic underpinnings of 
why such an effect may occur. Articles exploring a like versus dislike Likert scale would 
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be remised to ignore the asymmetry associated with markedness and linguistics. As 
shown, responses to big and small, many and few, and half full and half empty are 
asymmetrical. The unmarked term (big, many, full) results in behavior that is consistent 
with a neutral frame, while the marked term (small, few, empty) results in significantly 
smaller estimates and differences in slope.  
This research highlights the importance of considering qualitative cues 
(i.e., conversation cues) in the numeric judgment. As Critcher and Gilovich (2008) 
suggest in their work on incidental environmental anchors:  
 
Modern environments assault us with numbers. Jersey numbers, model numbers, 
and restaurant names to be sure, but also street addresses, product names, and 
contestant ID numbers, all of which have the potential to incidentally and 
inadvertently influence unrelated numerical judgments. 
 
In Critcher and Gilovich’s (2008) study, consumers estimated they would spend 
more money at a restaurant called Studio 97 than one called Studio 17. Based on the 
findings in this dissertation, would consumers be willing to spend less at a restaurant 
called Lower 97 versus Upper 97 or a restaurant called Studio 97 on Low Street versus 
Studio 97 on Elm Street? This research begins to explore the added effect qualitative 
words have on numerical perceptions and thus contributes to research on incidental 
environmental anchors as well.   
Magnitude priming (Oppenheimer et al. 2008), which has been associated with 
numerical perceptions, is a promising direction of research and, when combined with 
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linguistics cues, opens the door to look at potential stimuli that may indirectly effect 
product perceptions and willingness to pay. For example, what aspects of product 
labeling or marketing are not effective because they are used so often they lose their 
meaning? Words such as big and tall lose their meaning because they are used so 
frequently in communication. This research presents the opportunity to reexamine 
marketing communication from the lens of linguistics to determine whether language 
cues are really influencing consumers in the way marketers strive for.  
The research in this dissertation also has implications for research on goals. The 
goal-gradient theory (Kivetz, Urminsky, and Zheng 2006) argues that the closer you are 
to a goal, the more motivated you are to finish.  The goal gradient effect suggests that 
motivation increases as the distance to the goal decreases. In other words, a person will 
run faster if they are 1 mile away from a 10 mile goal as opposed to being 9 miles away. 
In a health context, one could extrapolate that a consumer will be more motivated to lose 
10 pounds when they are 2 pounds away from his or her weight loss goal than when they 
are 8 pounds away.  Based on the research in this dissertation, linguistic cues, although 
logically equivalent, may leak additional information that effects motivation. Perhaps a 
person will be more motivated to participate in healthy behaviors when his or her weight 
loss is framed in how few pounds they have to reach their goal as opposed to how many 
pounds.  
A similar, but orthogonal, theory is the small-area hypothesis (Koo and Fishbach 
2012), which argues that the framing of the goal influences motivation. The small-area 
hypothesis distinguishes between a framing of actions that have already been completed 
toward a goal versus actions that have not yet been completed (Koo and Fishbach 2012).  
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For example, consider a loyalty card in which a consumer has completed 80% of the 
visits to achieve the goal versus needing 20% more visits to complete the goal. The 
small-area hypothesis suggests that users are more motivated to complete a goal when 
their attention is directed to the smaller size (whether 20% completed or 20% remaining). 
Again, linguistics cues such as “How many stamps…” versus “How few stamps…” to 
achieve a goal may influence consumer motivation. 
Finally, this research provides a thorough overview of the theoretical 
underpinnings of quantitative and qualitative effects on numerical estimates. Similar to 
past reviews in top marketing journals on loyalty programs (e.g., Henderson, Beck, and 
Palmatier, 2011), signaling and product quality (Kirmani and Rao 2000), sponsorship 
(Cornwell, Weeks, and Roy 2005), or anchoring (Epley and Gilovich 2010), the literature 
review herein synthesizes multiple theories to show that numerical perceptions are more 
than just a number but incorporate a variety of other linguistic and conversational cues.  
 
Opportunities for Future Research 
 
This dissertation proposes several directions for further research of benefit to both 
the marketing and psychology literature.  
 
Numerical Judgments 
 
As discussed, markedness is largely a new concept in the marketing literature. As 
such, there are a plethora of future directions for the study of markedness in marketing 
and consumer behavior. Similarly, argumentative orientation and information leakage are 
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relatively new to the marketing literature and combining the three (markedness, 
argumentative orientation, and information leakage), particularly given their relationship 
to each other, may yield interesting future studies. For example, in the half empty versus 
half full scenario, what other information may influence how the information is 
perceived? How do negations (Paradis and Willners 2006; Bianchi et al. 2011), units 
(Pandelaere et al. 2011; Monga and Bagchi 2012) and other linguistics cues interact with 
a markedness based approach to numerical judgments. A small piece of information 
results in the consumer drawing a wide array of inferences, and thus future research is 
needed to identify what other effects result from a slight change in a linguistic cue.  
 
Emotions 
 
There are many potential directions for further research exploring the relationship 
among linguistic cues, specifically markedness and emotions. Consider the example: 
 
(A.) The arena is half full. 
(B.) The arena is half empty. 
 
Half full (A) seems to generate more positive emotions, or at least neutral 
emotions, than the half empty framing of (B). Future research may look at the emotional 
influence of markedness. Given there is an information asymmetry associated with the 
linguistic cues, is there also an emotional asymmetry? How might this be demonstrated? 
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There has been very little research integrating markedness and emotional scales such as 
PANAS (Watson, Clark, and Tellegen 1988) in marketing or psychology journals. 
 
Processing Theories 
 
The two primary processing theories discussed are both dual-processing theories 
but emphasize different aspects of processing. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) largely 
argue for a fast versus slow processing approach, while Reyna and Brainerd (1991) 
essentially argue for a gist (words) versus verbatim (numbers) approach. Although this 
research does not provide conclusive evidence to end the processing debate, or 
persuasion knowledge (Friestad and Wright 1994; Boush et al. 2009), it may provide 
additional information to advance the study of processing theories. Study 2 utilized two 
words that are considered antonyms, with one (small) being less common, yet the 
processing times were not significantly different. This seems to suggest, at the very least, 
that big and small are interpreted through the same processing path. Or that differences in 
processing theories need to be measured at a more granular or specific rate (hundredths of 
milliseconds) as opposed to more coarse response rates provided by survey software such 
as Qualtrics that is frequently used at universities. In addition, cognitive load (Sweller 
1988) may play a role in how markedness and information leakage is perceived. Study 6 
seemed to suggest that the more cognitive load (i.e. granularity of units), the smaller the 
effect of markedness. Cognitive load may decrease the effect of markedness as 
respondents are to cognitively busy to interpret semantic cues while making a judgment. 
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Marketing and Managerial Implications !
Marketing is a discipline that is built on communication. In fact, the definition of 
marketing, according to the American Marketing Association (2013), incorporates 
communication:  
 
Marketing is the activity, set of institutions, and processes for creating, 
communicating, delivering, and exchanging offerings that have value for 
customers, clients, partners, and society at large. 
 
From a billboard on a highway to a commercial on a television and a banner ad on 
a website to a 140 character tweet in a timeline, marketing is about communicating. As 
such, it is critically important to understand the linguistic cues that may alter perceptions 
of marketing messages. Marketers are often confronted with how to present numerical 
information; whether it be the framing of package pricing (Bagchi and Davis 2012) or 
pricing of sizes of goods (e.g., small vs. large), there are a plethora of opportunities to 
integrate linguistics cues (i.e., markedness) with numerical frames. The research in this 
dissertation helps marketers better understand how linguistics and numerical frames 
interact in a systematic way under the theoretical framework of markedness. 
Real world implications of anchoring have been established in real estate 
(Northcraft and Neale, 1987) and with purchase limits and quantity limits (Wansink, Kent, 
and Hoch, 1998), which opens the door for a linguistic approach to marketing to have 
similar real world effects. What other scenarios might words anchor respondents one way 
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or another? As shown, a simple change from half full to half empty has drastic 
implications for how people perceive numerical estimates, competitiveness of a game, 
and scarcity of tickets. Consider a project management scenario in which the term early 
versus late, another markedness pair (Lehrer 1985), is used in communication or 
estimating project completion dates. Zhang and Schwarz (2012) showed that respondents 
were more likely to predict a project would be late than early, but the results may also be 
the result of markedness in the questioning, which used the adjectives earliest and latest. 
Following the sales and management implications, the research may effect 
managerial myopia (Larwood and Whittaker 1977), a well documented finding in which 
managers are overly optimistic when planning for the future. Recent research has shown 
that managerial overconfidence can lead to managers making poor financial decisions 
and investments (Ishikawa and Takahashi 2010). Although projections are largely 
analyzed via computers in today’s environment, there is still an opportunity to apply the 
research in this dissertation to a sales context. For example, asking a manager “How few 
sales do you predict you will make next month?” versus “How many sales do you predict 
you will make next month?” may effect the accuracy of forecasting and reduce 
overconfidence in sales which has negative effects on the business.  
There are a variety of implications in the public health context as well. Are 
practitioners and businesses asking the right questions? “How often do you go to the 
doctor?” or “How many drinks have you had tonight?” may be cueing the wrong response. 
Given recent discussion on changes to blood alcohol content (BAC) limits in the United 
States, markedness may change the way in which information on alcohol consumption is 
perceived. For example, markedness (e.g., how many drinks vs. how few drinks) may 
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interact with numerical cues (.05 BAC vs. .08 BAC) or temporal cues (120 minutes vs. 2 
hours) in estimates of an appropriate consumption level of alcoholic beverages.  
As previously discussed, this research has implications for goal pursuit at a 
practical level. When faced with a goal (e.g., losing weight, running a particular distance, 
completing a task), there is an opportunity to frame the achievement, or lack thereof, in a 
particular context. Technology can be utilized to tell a runner how few steps remain rather 
than how many steps remain in a consumer’s daily step goal. In conjunction with theories 
such as the small-area hypothesis (Koo and Fishbach 2012), which largely focuses on 
numerical differences, linguistic cues may further enhance the motivation to achieve a 
goal. 
Marketing research is another area where this dissertation presents a strong 
contribution. Are the questions marketers are asking truly neutral? Are the questions 
biasing respondents one way or another? A linguistics-based approach to marketing 
research could have drastic implications. Practitioners sending out marketing research 
surveys may be inadvertently biasing results by leaking meaningful information. 
Subsequently, the conclusions from the research may be a reflection of how the question 
is framed, even more than previously understood, and severely mask consumers’ true 
perceptions.  
Perhaps the broadest, yet most powerful, marketing application deals with 
competition. The marked term, by definition, is negative. As such, it presents a unique 
opportunity to use an unmarked, or positive, term in reference to a firm’s own business 
but a marked term in reference to a competitor. For example, a season ticket salesman 
may say (in reference to a competitor), “Their arena is half empty”.  A gym may ask, 
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“How few pounds did you lose at [competitor]?” Given the unique power of the marked 
term displayed in this dissertation, it presents an opportunity to selectively use linguistic 
cues in reference to a competitor. 
Finally, in a marketing and communications environment with 140 character 
messages (Twitter), six second (Vine) or 15 second (Instagram) video, and 10 second 
multimedia messages that disappear (SnapChat), the importance of understanding 
language is even more critical as each word becomes more important to understanding 
the intent of the message. In a sports context, one word in a 1000+ character long 
description of ticket plan on a website may not be critical but one word in a 140-character 
tweet about ticket plans is significant. In a scrolling economy in which consumers scroll 
through Facebook posts and Twitter feeds, language is increasingly important in 
communicating the intended message.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Linguistics cues are embedded in language and conversation while representing a 
critical component of human interaction across a broad set of disciplines. Similar to the 
combination of business and psychology in the development of consumer psychology, the 
combination of business and linguistics shows similar promise. As such, the term 
consumer linguistics is proposed to encourage the scientific study of language in 
consumer-based scenarios. The markedness approach discussed in this research is a 
preliminary step to illustrate the implications of a systematic linguistics approach within 
consumer behavior. The research provided in this dissertation further explores the 
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relationship between linguistics cues, such as markedness, and how consumers make 
numerical judgments. A big crowd is different than a small crowd. A half empty arena is 
different than a half full arena. Marketing is about numbers but not necessarily just a 
number.  
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